奧古斯丁式時間觀的「關注－意向」張力結構－時間作為倫理概念的現象學前提

十九世紀的歐洲經歷着精神科學合法性的危機，奧古斯丁的《懺悔錄》因其內省的思維風格被捲入了一場關涉該如何獲取關於人的確定知識的方法論之爭。胡塞爾認為《懺悔錄》卷十一早已揭示出人的認識活動的時間性結構，從而將其引入「描述心理學和認識論」，開啟了與奧古斯丁式時間觀的自然哲學詮釋範式和形而上學詮釋範式並立的現象學詮釋範式。但現有的現象學詮釋範式始終無法解決現象學本身固有的自我中心傾向的困境。本文借助現象學描述再現《懺悔錄》卷十一時間命題的「關注－意向」結構，並通過辨明意向概念在認識論史和奧古斯丁術語體系中的語用情況，刻畫出奧古斯丁意向概念的雙向連通性和時間「現象」的言語交互屬性。時間作為現象是交互的屬性，交互的發生要求交互相關者的自我敞開性以及愛的德性，這意味着時間擁有基礎的倫理維度。這一發現為解決現象學詮釋範式的自我中心傾向的困境提供了新可能。

關鍵字

奧古斯丁；時間；自我；意向；愛

並列摘要

While 19^(th) Century Europe was experiencing a crisis in the legitimacy of the human sciences, the introspective style of Augustine's Confessions was also caught up in a methodological debate about how to obtain objective knowledge of humans. Edmund Husserl argues that Confessions XI already reveals the temporal structure of human consciousness, thus introducing it into the history of epistemology: opening up a phenomenological hermeneutic paradigm to Augustinian time alongside the paradigms of natural philosophy and of metaphysics. However, the existing phenomenological paradigm also suffers from the criticisms of the so-called self-centralism, which is rooted in the phenomenology itself. This article represents the "attention-intentio" structure of the distentio animi in Confessions XI, and portrays the intersubjective accessibility of Augustinian intentionality, as well as the property of time, by clarifying the usages of the intentio-concept both in the epistemological history and in Augustine's terminology. Time, as phenomenon, is the property of verbal interaction, which requires the active openness of the interacting-related as well as the virtue of love. This implies that time possesses a foundational ethical dimension and thus offers a new possibility for recovering the tendency of self-centralism.

並列關鍵字

Augustine ； Time ； Self ； Intentionality ； Love

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