總經理決策行爲影響其薪酬之研究

The Impacts of CEO Decision Behaviors on His Compensation

林美倫(Mei-Lun Lin)

《臺南科大學報（人文管理）》 27期 (2008/09) Pp. 235-249

https://doi.org/10.6970/JTUTHSM.200809.0235

摘要

隨著經營權與所有權日趨分離，代理理論說明代理人會為了追求自利，而犧牲股東之利益。本研究之目的旨在探討總經理在薪酬契約中，是否會因為面臨短視行為以及職務雙重性之情況下，而從事裁減研究發展支出之行為，以保障本身的薪酬水準。研究發展支出可提升競爭力創造企業價值；然而財務會計準則委員會基於研究發展未來效益之不確定及缺乏因果關係等理由，予以費用化認列，提供管理者減少當期研究發展支出以達到短期盈餘目標之誘因。本研究以國內上市公司為樣本進行Panel Data模型分析，實證結果發現，在同時出現短視與雙重身份時，增加研究發展支出反而減少總經理薪酬；若均無短視及雙重身份之情況，增加研究發展支出將使總經理薪酬增加。此結果支持本研究預測，總經理在面臨短視及雙重身份時，將藉由刪減研究發展支出以保障自身的薪酬水準。

關鍵字

短視行爲 ； 雙重性 ； 總經理薪酬 ； 研究發展支出

並列摘要

The purpose of this research is to probe into CEOs in a situation of myopia and duality whether they can be engaged in the behavior of cutting down the investment of research and development (R&D) in order to ensure their own salary level. R&D can raise competitiveness and create corporation's value. But the Financial Accounting Standards Board considers that R&D is an expense by the reasons of uncertainty of future benefit in R&D and scarce causality. It offers a motive of a CEO to reduce R&D in order to reach the goal of the short-term earnings. Regard listed company of Taiwan as the research object and use Panel data model to analysis. The empirical results are pointed out when the situations of myopia and duality exist at the same time, the CEO compensation decreases by increasing the R&D. If there is no myopia and duality, the CEO compensation will increase by increasing the R&D. Hence, the CEO will ensure one's own salary level by deleting R&D while presenting myopia and duality.

並列關鍵字

Myopia ； Duality ； CEO Compensation ； Research and Development R&D