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Underwriter Reputation in the Stabilization of Initial Public Offerings: The Evidence from Transactions Data

並列摘要


Price stabilization of initial public offerings (IPOs) is a legal form of stock manipulation, initiated by the lead underwriter to facilitate the distribution of IPO shares. In this paper, we develop two new methods to detect price stabilization based on the transaction patterns in the secondary market after issuance. Using these methods, we find that prestigious lead under-writers are more likely to stabilize an IPO in the secondary market after issuance. The results are consistent with lead underwriters acting to preserve their reputation capital as underwriters of initial public offerings when IPO transaction prices do not increase after issuance.

參考文獻


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