- 期刊
Asymmetric Timeliness of Write-Down Reporting: Do Managers Always Withhold Write-Down Information?
減損報導之不對稱及時性：經理人對減損總是隱而不報嗎？
摘要
This paper focuses on asset write-downs and investigates whether managers make write-down decisions with asymmetric timeliness. Based on the economic rationality incorporated in agency theory, the argument is made here that under different levels of information asymmetry, managers have incentives to report firm-specific and market-wide unfavorable information with differential timeliness. Managers report macroeconomic unfavorable information in a timely fashion, as the transparency involved in such information entails a greater risk of reputation losses and litigation risks resulting from untimely reporting. Low accountability due to lack of control also contributes to managers' early reporting. Furthermore, managers report unfavorable firm-specific factors slowly, as career concerns and risk of punishment for late reporting motivate managers to withhold such information where they are privy to information which outsiders are not. Empirical results suggest that the untimely reporting of firm-specific unfavorable information contributes to two-period recurring write-downs and may provide further evidence of managers' reporting behavior.
並列摘要
本文聚焦於資產減損之認列，以檢視經理人減損決策的不對稱及時性。有別於過去文獻，本文將經理人考量是否提列減損之經濟因素依其造成資訊不對稱之程度加以分類，並推論經理人對造成不同資訊不對稱程度之經濟事件有不同的報導誘因，因而產生認列資產減損的不對稱及時性。本文認為由於總體經濟事件之資訊不對稱性低，因而經理人傾向及時報導以規避未及時報導導致之訴訟與聲譽損失，而總體經濟事件對經理人的低可歸責性亦強化經理人及時報導的動機。而對於資訊不對稱程度高的公司個別事件，經理人將因考量其職位安全性與規避未及時報導所產生損失之可能性而有延後報導的誘因。實證結果顯示企業對公司個別事件之不及時報導導致資產減損在短期內重覆發生並提供經理人外部報導行為之進一步證據。