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政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析

Electoral Decisions for Political Party and Its Un-nominated Aspirants

摘要


無論何種選舉,未獲政黨提名者皆有參選的動機,面對與政黨候選人相互較勁的權衡之下,未獲政黨提名者可能持續參選到底,或者決定退出選戰。本研究旨在探究,在政黨進行嚇阻策略情況下,基於何種理由,未獲政賞提名者將選擇參選到底,抑或即刻退出選舉。作者以為,無論政黨或者是參選人,皆為考量選舉「成本」(costs)與「效益」(benefits)而進行「理性抉擇」(rational choice)的決策個體,當參與競選所必須投入的固定成本超過預期效益時,未獲提名者將不會選擇參選。鑑此,本研究利用「三階段賽局模型」(three-stage game model),處理政黨面對未獲提名者決定參選時,政黨的最佳策略均衡。其結果顯示,若是政賞無法以嚇阻有效勸退未獲提名者,進而以其所擁有的「票源實力」(vote capacity),展開對未獲提名者進行抵抗行為時,政黨將清楚地知道,對未獲提名者進行抵抗,會比容忍其參選更為不利,因此政黨不會採取抵抗行為;於此同時,未獲提名者也會識破政黨的抵抗乃是一種「不可信的威脅」(incredible threat),毅然決定參選形成攪局。

並列摘要


In any given election, aspirants without party approvals still have the incentive to run as independent candidates. In the face of the competition with patty nominees, unsuccessful aspirants could insist on campaigning against nominating candidates or determine to withdraw from the contests. The purpose of this study is to examine the reasons for unsuccessful aspirants decide to run as candidates or to withdraw from elections. It is hypothesized that both political patties and aspirants are rational decision makers in an attempt to minimize electoral costs and meanwhile maximize the benefits. The aspirants without party blessings could decide not to run in elections if they calculate that the fixed electoral costs exceed the expected payoffs. This study employs a three-stage game model to reach some corollaries based on the subgame perfect equilibriums for political parties and unnominated aspirants. The findings reveal that political parties are always unable to deter unsuccessful aspirants from being independent candidates, and then one common strategy is to boycott the aspirants in the elections. However, political patties could learn that adopting defense tactics will pay more costs than tolerating the aspirants to run as mavericks. As a result, the unsuccessful aspirants should wage campaign activities when they perceive that political parties claiming to use deterrent strategies are just bluffs and therefore ”incredible threats.”

參考文獻


吳重禮(2002)。民意調查應用於提名制度的爭議:以1998年第四屆立法委員選舉民主進步黨初選民調爲例。選舉研究。9(1),81-111。
Aldrich, John H.(1995).Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Bartels, Larry M.(1988).Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice.Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.
Chong, Dennis.,Jeffery Friedman. (ed.)(1996).The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered.New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.
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被引用紀錄


林珮霖(2017)。第九屆立法委員選舉民進黨艱困選區提名策略之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201702968

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