- 期刊
- OpenAccess
兩岸洽簽「臺灣不獨大陸不武」協議理論與民意基礎研究－一項臺灣民眾的民意調查分析
Survey Research of Taiwanese Attitudes Regarding a Cross-Strait ＂No Independence, No Use of Force＂ Interim Agreement
摘要
由於蔡英文政府上台後，拒絕接受所謂的「九二共識」，北京因此中斷與臺北的對話，並導致兩岸關係陷入僵局。民意支持兩岸政治談判來到前所未有的高峰，但是支持談判結果達成兩岸統一者少之又少，更多希望北京能承認臺灣的主權地位，雙方建立外交關係。這兩種結果在現階段，甚至在可預見的未來都沒有可能。因此一項不涉及兩岸終局政治安排的中程協議，即「臺灣不獨大陸不武」協議，即成為本論文的研究主題，希望可以藉此一協議的洽簽緩解兩岸的「安全困境」，防止敵意螺旋上升，以維持台海現狀穩定。本論文更運用「談判前置期理論」中的「時機成熟理論」，探討洽簽此一協議的可能性。認為當兩岸都認知到目前的僵局，是一種「相互傷害的僵局」，必須「尋找出路」時，兩岸談判「臺灣不獨大陸不武」協議即變成一種可能的選項。另外本論文亦認識到兩岸政治談判是一種「雙層賽局」，依照Putnam（1988）的理論中，民意是國內（即第二層）的行動者，攸關政治談判的成功與否。因此運用蔡英文政府上任前後三次全國性民意調查資料，瞭解臺灣民眾支持兩岸洽簽「臺灣不獨大陸不武」協議的情形，並進一步分析其原因。透過「二元勝算對數模型」（binary logit model），選擇包括性別、年齡、籍貫、教育程度、收看媒體屬性、政黨認同、國族認同、國家認同，和統獨抉擇等個體層次變項，檢驗這些變數對支持或反對此一協議的解釋力。研究結果顯示，臺灣民眾顯著地支持兩岸簽署「臺灣不獨大陸不武」中程協議，不管是馬政府後期或蔡政府初期，都獲得半數以上的臺灣民眾支持，呈現穩定地趨勢；特別是蔡政府執政後，更顯著地增加到六成。並認為簽署這樣的協議可以帶來包括降低兩岸緊張關係等諸多好處，但仍然無法消除兩岸的軍備競賽、降低臺灣依賴美國的安全保證。同時亦有受訪者不贊成洽簽這項協議，特別是年輕受訪者、大專以上教育程度者，以及支持臺灣獨立、政黨取向屬「泛綠」陣營者，這些族群的意見都會為這項談判帶來新的變數，但也可能成為談判的籌碼。
並列摘要
Since Tsai Ing-wen assumed the presidency in Taiwan and Beijing cut off cross- Strait dialogue due to Tsai's refusal to accept the so-called ＂92 consensus,＂ public support in Taiwan for political negotiation has risen to unprecedently high levels. At the same time, the number of Taiwanese who could accept unification, Beijing's desired outcome for political negotiation, is very low. This study uses three national public opinion surveys regarding cross-Strait political negotiation conducted before and after the Tsai administration took office to analyze Taiwanese attitudes toward a possible compromise interim negotiation agreement in which Taipei would renounce independence in return for Beijing's renunciation of force while deferring Taiwan's final political status to future negotiation. Binary logit model analysis is used to examine the effect of individual-level variables on support for a ＂no independence, no war＂ agreement, including gender, age, provincial origin, education level, media source preference, political party identification, national and ethnic identity, and unification/independence preference The first section of the paper reviews the literature on cross-Strait political negotiation, compares various potential negotiation formulas, and looks at past surveys of Taiwanese public opinion toward an interim or peace agreement. Using insights from pre-negotiation theory, this section examines the likelihood that political negotiation will take place, why ＂no independence, no war＂ is the formula most likely to bring the two sides to the table, and why public opinion could play a critical role in the process of negotiation of an interim cross-Strait agreement. The second section compares the three surveys with respect to aggregate levels of public support for a ＂no independence, no war＂ pact and to public expectations about the effects such an agreement would have on Taiwan's national sovereignty, national security, international space and economic development. The third section outlines the design of the binary logit model and discusses the choice of individual-level variables that will be tested for their impact on public support for an interim deal. The final section discusses the finding of the statistical analysis and their implications. The study shows that there is stable majority support among the Taiwanese public for Taipei to conclude a ＂no independence, no war＂ agreement with Beijing, and that support for this agreement has risen since Tsai Ing-wen took office. There is optimism among the public that such an agreement could reduce tension between the two sides, but skepticism about its capacity to eliminate arms racing and reliance on military support from the United States. Negotiation of this type of agreement would face stronger resistance from younger, more educated citizens and those whose personal and political identity is linked to support for Taiwan independence. The opinions of these groups would create uncertainty about ratification of a ＂no independence, no use of force＂ agreement but could also be a source of bargaining leverage for Taipei.