後疫情時代對於資訊科技的大量運用與依賴,幸尚未產生傳統安全研究文獻所擔憂的網路浩劫;亦即當人類社會過度仰賴資訊科技將使人類社會暴露於不可控制的數位末日。特別是2022年2月起的俄烏戰爭顯示,即便各國所畏懼的俄羅斯網路作戰能力在戰前或許活躍,但在開戰後卻鮮有戰果。然當前國內網路安全論述普遍推斷,由於「攻擊是最好的防禦」,故我國須透過網路攻勢能量的強化來占據未來網路戰場主導地位。而過去這樣的主流論述,常忽略任何的戰略設想須同時檢視「地理」及「科技」等因素,瞭解這些因素如何影響所關切作戰領域在攻擊與防禦間之發展計量。本研究希望能縮小當前國內學界主流論述與軍事作戰實務在本項安全議題上的文獻缺口,並結合近年多次國際事件之實證性與經驗性證據論述,以精進當前我國戰略與安全研究社群對網路安全之認知。
In the post-COVID-19 era, the prevalent utilization of ICTs offers an excellent contrast against the pessimistic prophecy of past literature, which is that over-dependence on ICTs makes human society extremely vulnerable to digital catastrophe. While the Russia-Ukraine War starting in 2022 also indicated that the Russian cyber force may be very active prior to the conflict, it has accomplished no significant achievement since the conflict has escalated. Given that Taiwan faces a unique geopolitical threat from China, it has often been argued by scholars that Taiwan shall enhance its offensive cyber capability to defend itself and improve its cybersecurity. However, this kind of mainstream view is based on the same assumption of the military operation in the physical domains that "offense is the best defense." Such an argument ignores that the advance in "technology" and the change in "operational environment" are two essential factors to include when considering the preference between offense and defense. This research plans to reduce the knowledge gap between cybersecurity and the above factors, to improve the understanding of cybersecurity among the epistemic community of security and strategic scholars in order to offer policy-relevant recommendations for the future improvement of Taiwan's cybersecurity policy.