中國大陸國有企業權力競爭、所有權結構與經營績效

Power Competition, Ownership Structure and Operating Performance of State-Owned Enterprises in China

張敏蕾(Ming-Lei Chang)

《遠景基金會季刊》 6卷1期 (2005/01) Pp. 51-77

https://doi.org/10.7063/PQ.200501.0051

摘要

本研究針對國有企業經理人的權力競爭行爲，分析經理人如何運用謀取權位投資(power-seeking investment)，以爭取經理人職位。本文分析經理人的生産性努力投入與謀取權位投資二者，如何受經理人的經營能力、持股比例與企業所有權轉換等因素的影響。研究發現若官員對經理人選的決定有較大影響力時，而經理人員所得與企業獲利無關，多投入生産性努力只會減少經理人之效用，故每個成員將只顧從事權力競爭，對於生産性努力活動投入或企業獲利較不關心。但是，隨著經理人持股比例、分成程度與經營能力之提高，經理人較有意願去投入生産性努力。足見若經理人的獎酬合約中加企業營運的利潤考量，的確可以激發經理人對企業營運的生産性投入。

關鍵字

國有企業 ； 改革 ； 權力競爭 ； 所有權結構 ； 營運績效

並列摘要

The main purpose of this research is to analyze how the managers (or employees) of the state-owned enterprises in China, using the power competition investment to fight for the manager position. The power competition of managers are defined as two ways, one is productive effort input, this has the positive help in increasing the profit of the enterprise. The other is power-seeking investment, it has no incremental benefit to the enterprise, but this investment can be used in fighting for the manager position. For the state-owned enterprises in China are the quasi-governmental structure, and the government officials have significant influences to decide which one can be the manager. This research discusses how the two power competition investments are affected by the ownership structure, manager's compensation scheme and the operating abilities of managers. This research provides the evidence that when there is no connection between managers' personal income and enterprises profit, manager candidates prefer to input more power-seeking investment than productive effort, and concern less about the operating performance of enterprises. On the other hand, as the increasing in the proportion of manager's profits sharing, the manager candidates are more willing to input more productive effort.

並列關鍵字

State-Owned Enterprises ； Reform ； Power Competition ； Ownership Structure ； Operating Performance