最後通牒賽局理論與研究簡介

Introduction to "Ultimatum Game" Theory and Its Research

楊建成(Cheng-Chen Yang)

《社會科學論叢》 1卷2期 (2007/10) Pp. 1-21

https://doi.org/10.30401/RSS.200710_1(2).0001

摘要

最後通牒賽局是一簡單的談判賽局，但有理論和應用上的重要性。賽局理論對於最後通牒賽局的談判結果有一精確的理論預測，不過此一理論預測卻遭到實驗證據一再推翻否定。最後通牒賽局的理論預測和實證資料不符不一致，其原因究竟為何？本文從各種不同角度回顧文獻的相關研究，涉及行為經濟學、人類學、甚至腦神經科學的發現。

關鍵字

最後通牒賽局 ； 談判 ； 實驗 ； 行為經濟學 ； 神經經濟學

並列摘要

Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Economics at Academia Sinica, and Jointly Appointed Professor in Public Finance, National Chengchi University Abstract Ultimatum game is a simple bargaining game. Although simple, it is important in theory and practice. Game theory gives a precise prediction regarding the bargaining outcome of the ultimatum game. However, this precise prediction receives an outright rejection from experimental data. What are the possible reasons for the observed deviation between theoretic prediction and experimental data? This paper surveys the relevant literature from a variety of fields, including behavioral economics, anthropology, and neuroscience.

並列關鍵字

ultimatum game ； bargaining ； experiment ； behavioral economics ； neuron-economics