CEO經營能力對董事會與小股東間代理問題影響之研究

Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?

黃鴻飛(Hong-Fei Huang)

指導教授 ： 廖咸興

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.00096

摘要

董事會與小股東間的代理問題 (Board to minority equity holders)在文獻中少有提及，本篇論文探討CEO的經營能力，是否能影響董事會開除CEO的個人成本。本文將分別使用Demerjian (2012)中估計的CEO能力指標MA-Score及Chen, Liao, Chen (WP)中以Taylor (2010)的模型為基礎而設計出的董事會個人成本的指標Cpers來進行實證研究。結果顯示，能力較高的CEO及CEO確實會造成更嚴重的代理問題，使得公司表現不好時較難開除其CEO。同時，本篇研究也指出，CEO能力的波動性將影響董事會與小股東間的代理問題，波動性高的CEO將使代理問題嚴重程度下降。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 小股東 ； 董事會 ； CEO經營能力

並列摘要

This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm's CEO's ability, the more serious the firm's B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm's CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm's B-E agency problem.

並列關鍵字

Agency problem ； Minority equity holders ； Boards ； Managerial ability

參考文獻

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