利益團體遊說反傾銷稅的經濟分析

An Analysis on the Lobby of Anti-Dumping Tariff

許丞忠(Cheng-Chung Hsu)

指導教授 ： 賴法才

國立暨南國際大學/管理學院/經濟學系/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6837/NCNU.2007.00056

摘要

本文分析美國國際貿易委員會(ITC)在政治遊說的壓力下如何裁決國內產業對進口廠商傾銷之控訴。國際貿易委員會(ITC)為美國負責裁定傾銷案件的準政府機關。國會監督委員任命六名專業人士為ITC的委員，以多數決投票的方式表決案件。利益團體捐贈政治獻金給立法委員間接而非直接影響ITC的最終裁決。本論文延伸Hao、Sherwin and Wing (2001)的二人投票模型，分析ITC委員仲裁傾銷案的多數決投票行為。每位ITC委員考量錯誤接受與錯誤拒絕的相對成本作為其投票的依據。當委員解讀證據的資訊大於其門檻值時，錯誤拒絕的期望成本高於錯誤接受期望成本，所以他會投同意票;反之則不會。利益團體即是透過國會議員影響此二種錯誤判決的成本，而影響一般傾銷案成立的機率。當證據是公開的但解讀之資訊是私有時，每位委員都有可能有操縱資訊的誘因。文中證明每位委員錯誤接受的相對成本齊一增加時，傾銷案通過的機率就會降低。基於反傾銷稅越高錯誤接受的相對期望成本就越高的假設，我們藉由雇傭模型探討利益團體政治遊說下的均衡傾銷稅。

關鍵字

國際貿易委員會、遊說、多數決

並列摘要

This thesis studies how International Trade Commission (ITC), facing the pressure of political lobbying, makes committee decisions in ruling the domestic industries’ anti-dumping suits against foreign importers. The International Trade Commission (ITC) is a quasi-judicial government agency charged with administrating U.S. antidumping laws. Congressional oversight committee appoints six professional personages as commissioners of ITC, which makes decisions by majority vote. The interest groups supply contributions to the members of certain congressional committees to indirectly influence the ITC decisions. The study extends the two-member voting model of Hao, Sherwin and Wing (2001) to analyses ITC decisions in ruling dumping cases. Each commissioner of ITC makes his vote contemplating the relative cost of false acceptance to false rejection. When commissioner’s private information about the evidence is over his/her threshold, he/she must vote “accept” because the expected cost of false rejection is higher than the one of false acceptance; otherwise, he/she rejects the case. The interest groups lobby the legislators to affect ITC committee members’ expected cost of false decisions and in turn influence the probability of accepting dumping cases. As the evidence is public but the information is private, each commissioner has incentives to manipulate his/her own information. We show that when the relative costs of false acceptance homogenously increase for all commissioners the probability of accepting dumping cases decreases. Furthermore, assuming that the relative expected cost of false acceptance is positively correlated to the level of anti-dumping duties, we apply principal-agent framework to analyze interest groups’ lobby activities of skimping on protection and the equilibrium anti-dump duty.

並列關鍵字

ITC、Lobbying、Majority

參考文獻

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