中國股權分置改革對多重大股東與企業投資現金流量敏感度之調節效果

The impact of spilt share structure reform on multiple large shareholders’ investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from China

陳靜玫(Jing-mei Chen)

指導教授 ： 洪榮華

國立中央大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本研究探討中國上市企業之多重大股東於投資與現金流量敏感度的影響，並進一步區分為中央政府、地方政府、機構投資人三種不同多重大股東身份，依此組合出下列四類股權結構:1.第一大股東為中央政府第二大股東為機構投資人；2.地方政府為第一大股東機構投資人為第二大股東；3.機構投資人為第一大股東中央政府為第二大股東；4.機構投資人為第一大股東地方政府為第二大股東。目的為探討不同所有權結構下多重大股東之持股動機、影響力於敏感度上是否有不同表現。另外，考量股權分置改革於企業所有權之衝擊，研究亦分析改革後多重大股東之角色是否產生變化。
本研究以2003年至2012年間於深圳及上海證交所之上市公司為研究對象，使用panel data迴歸模型進行驗證。結果指出，多重大股東特質於中國上市企業造成投資與現金流量之U型曲線更陡，投資與內部現金關係更為敏感。另外，當機構投資人為第一大股東時，地方政府第二大股東身份能使敏感度顯著變緩，減緩投資不足現象。其餘則不具顯著影響。另外有關股權分置改革之影響，研究發現股改促使企業投資與現金流量敏感度之關係變緩，特別為內部營運現金為正時，該結果顯示多重大股東並未因政府股份釋出而提升內部治理效果。另一方面，若第一大股東為機構投資人而第二大股東身份為中央或地方政府之企業，U型投資現金流量曲線改革後顯著變緩，結果顯示，機構投資人控制企業下，中央政府積極達成提升內部治理政策目標，地方政府其角色可能為積極配合；抑或是紓困企業使地方經濟不受衝擊。

關鍵字

多重大股東 ； 投資現金流量敏感度 ； 股權分置改革 ； 所有權結構

並列摘要

We investigate the impact of multiple large shareholders (MLSS) on firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivity. We categorize identity of MLSS as central-government, local government, and institutional investors, and then further divide this three kinds of identity into four ownership structures: 1. Central government as largest stockholder and institutional investor as second largest stockholder. 2. Local government is the largest stockholder and institutional investor as second largest stockholder. 3. Institutional investor is the largest stockholder, central government as the second one. 4. Institutional investor is the largest stockholder, local government as the second one. We investigate whether different identities have different impact on firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, we take the split share structure reform into account. Our sample includes all companies listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchanges during 2003-2012 and use panel data regression models to analyze the impact of split share structure reform on firms’ investment behaviors. Our results indicate that the presence of MLSS results in a sharper U-shaped curve, implying entrenchment effect. Specifically, when firms are controlled by institutional investors, local government as second largest stockholder can make the U-shaped curve flatter, indicating a mitigation of underinvestment problem. However, the findings of other subsamples have insignificant influences on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Finally, after spilt share structure reform, when institutional investor is the controlling shareholder and state as the second largest stockholder can make U-shaped curve flatter. These findings imply either central or local government would cooperate with the institutional investor, that is the largest shareholder, to lower financial constraint or enhance investment efficiency.

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