本研究旨在探討分析師跟隨與成本僵固之間的關聯性。以往文獻指出代理成本與成本僵固呈正向關係,而從另一脈文獻得知分析師的跟隨除了可提升公司的價值外並為公司帶來監督治理等效果,減少管理者和投資者間因利益不一致所產生的代理成本。因此本研究試圖檢測分析師的監督效果是否能減緩成本僵固的情形。本研究以1990年至2012年為樣本期間,實證結果發現,公司分析師跟隨個數越高時,該公司發生成本僵固性的程度就愈低。同時,為了檢驗加入其他控制變數是否會改變分析師和成本僵固性間的影響,本研究使用Anderson et al.(2003)的模型測試分析師對成本僵固行為的影響,實證結果亦發現,即使加入了其他控制變數,也沒有改變分析師跟隨會降低銷管費用不對稱的現象。本文是第一篇發現分析師跟隨個數會影響公司成本行為的研究。
Prior studies have documented the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, and argue that SG&A cost asymmetry is partially driven by managerial agency incentives. On the other hand, researchers argue that financial analysts facilitate more effective monitoring of firms’ activities and, thereby, reducing agency costs. This study integrates the two streams of research by examining the relationship between analyst following and the degree of cost asymmetry. Using data for the US firms over the period 1990-2012, we find that there is a negative association between analyst following and the degree of cost asymmetry. Our results suggest that financial analysts play an important governance role by preventing empire-building managers from over-spending on SG&A costs.