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Have the Determinants of Implicit Guarantee and Intervention Changed during the Financial Crisis of 2008?

隱性保證與干預之決定在金融危機期間是否改變?

摘要


This paper investigates whether the determinants of implicit guarantee and intervention change during the financial crisis of 2008? It finds the following results. First, the harm of intervention is more severe for banks with better financial strength, but it is mitigated in countries with better sovereign ratings. Second, strong banks receive more support in the crisis than in the non-crisis period, and countries with strong sovereign ratings provide fewer guarantees during the crisis period. Third, the effects of implicit intervention do not change after the financial crisis. Finally, country-specific factors can explain the determinants of implicit intervention.

並列摘要


本文探討政府隱性保證與干預的決定在金融危機期間是否改變。發現,第一,政府干預造成的傷害對財務表現佳的銀行影響更嚴重,而主權評等較佳的國家可以減少干預的風險。其次,財務佳的銀行在金融危機期間收到更多隱性保證,而主權評等佳的國家提供較少隱性保證。第三,銀行獲得較高隱性干預的機率可以由國家特定變數解釋。

參考文獻


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Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Edward J. Kane, and Luc Laeven, 2008, Deposit Insurance around the World: Issues of Design and Implementation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
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