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發生負面社會責任事件是否傳遞盈餘資訊性?

Do Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events Signal Earnings Informativeness?

摘要


本研究以Collins et al.(1994)的盈餘資訊性模型為實證架構,探討公司發生資訊公告類型負面聲譽事件是否傳遞盈餘資訊性。公司發生資訊公告類型負面聲譽事件,在某種程度意味管理者較不重視公司聲譽,對會計報導或盈餘品質的要求較低。而我國上市(櫃)公司內部控制有效性評估,除少數情境外,並非強制揭露的報告,故投資者對公司內部控制制度的良窳或執行內部控制的態度,欠缺正式報告加以評估。倘若資訊公告類型負面聲譽事件可以傳遞公司是否重視聲譽或存在內部控制缺失的訊息,則發生此類型負面聲譽事件公司可能有較低之盈餘品質,本研究預期低盈餘品質將降低盈餘與報酬間的連結,降低盈餘資訊性。在排除發生非資訊公告類型負面聲譽事件樣本後,實證結果顯示:相較於未發生負面聲譽事件之公司,發生資訊公告類型負面聲譽事件之公司,有顯著較低之未來盈餘資訊性;在部分設定下,該公司亦有顯著較低之當期盈餘資訊性。此實證發現意味投資者將發生資訊公告類型的負面聲譽事件,解讀為影響公司風險管理與未來盈餘持續性之因子,並將之納入評價決策,導致該公司有較低之盈餘資訊性。本研究進行若干敏感性測試,發現實證結果具備相當的穩固性。

並列摘要


Based on the Collins et al. (1994) model, this study examines whether a firm's occurrence of disclosure-type negative reputation events signal informativeness of current and future earnings. We conjecture that reputation concerns will motivate high-reputation firms to maintain high financial reporting quality, leading to a less occurrence of disclosure-type negative reputation events. Moreover, the listed firms are not required to disclose the effectiveness of internal control in Taiwanese stock market. This study hypothesizes that an occurrence of disclosure-type negative reputation events can signal both a firm's reputation and the weakness of internal control system, which in turn, provides investors with less current and future earnings information about the firm's prospects leading to a lower earnings informativeness of that firm. Empirical results show that, compared to the firms do not incur negative reputation events, firms that incurred disclosure-type negative reputation events are associated with a lower informativeness of future earnings. Yet, the lower informativeness of current earnings for firms that incurred disclosure-type negative reputation events is only supported in some setting. The findings are consistent with the notion that firms with disclosure-type negative reputation events can address their increased firm-specific business risks and decreased earnings persistence of concerned by investors, then deteriorates the earnings informativeness. This study conducts several diagnostic tests and documents the empirical results are robust to various specifications.

參考文獻


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