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IS CLASSIFIED BOARD THE WEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS

摘要


Prior literature suggests that classified boards may have the opposite impacts on financial restatements: some emphasize the exacerbating impact, while others advocate the mitigating impact. This study extends prior research by investigating whether classified boards exacerbate or mitigate restatements. Specifically, this study empirically examines the relation between the presence of classified boards and the incidence of financial restatement during the period 1998 to 2012 of publicly-traded and widely-held firms in United States. We find a strong negative association between classified boards and financial restatements. We also find evidence that classified boards are negatively related to financial misstatements with high-concern reasons (fraud, reserve estimation failures, and revenue recognition issues). Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. Overall, this study casts doubt on the view of the exacerbating impact, while it supports the argument on the mitigating impact as shown by the reduction in the incidence of restatements in firms with classified boards.

參考文獻


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