「資源邊界」與「共用資源自主治理」－以蘭嶼飛魚漁場衝突事件為例

Resources Boundaries and Self-Governed CPRs: Using the Conflict of Fisheries Grounds of Flying Fish around the Orchid Island as an Example

林育賜(Yu-Tzu Lin)

《農業與經濟》 51期 (2013/12) Pp. 87-115

https://doi.org/10.6181/agec.2013.51.04

摘要

漁業資源是典型的「共用資源」（common-pool resources，CPRs），共用資源的使用者雖知若一同減少使用資源，將獲得最高的集體利益，但還是會陷入繼續耗用共用資源的困境。自1960年代以來，學界普遍是在Hardin（1968）所提出的方向下來思考如何由國家立法或價格機制來避免共用資源的耗竭；但1990年代初Ostrom（1990）另闢蹊徑，提出由「資源使用團體來自主治理共用資源」。本文以蘭嶼飛魚漁場衝突事件為引，闡明蘭嶼附近海域的漁場面臨了共用資源困境，繼而檢視Ostrom（1990）的共用資源自主治理理論以及蘭嶼的傳統漁場分配制度，在以Ostrom（1990）的「清楚定義的邊界原則」來檢視此衝突事件後發現，一個原本可解決共用資源困境的原生性制度會因為使用者邊界被打破而受到影響；再者，政府為調和此一衝突，另行創設了一條資源使用邊界，來區分原資源使用者（達悟）與新加入的資源使用者（漢），但卻未考量自然資源使用的「公眾信託原則」（public trust doctrine）。此案例亦昭示，由於飛魚跨界洄游產卵，一地或一國的政策是否能達成飛魚資源之永續，會受到其他沿岸國如何使用洄游到其海域飛魚的影響，此時對於共用資源的治理就不能僅限於一地之自主治理，而是要從跨國或跨界的尺度來思維。再者，僅強調原住民族對傳統海域的自主治理，無法充份解決共用資源困境。因此，思索如何融合Hardin（1968）以及Ostrom（1990）的理論，並依不同尺度來彈性使用解決方案或為未來要務。

關鍵字

蘭嶼傳統漁場 ； 共用資源自主治理 ； 公眾信託原則

並列摘要

Fisheries resources are typical Common-Pool Resources (CPRs); users of CPRs know that if they used resources less together, they would get the highest collective benefits. Even so, they would go on exploiting resources respectively, trapped in such a dilemma. Since 1960s, the social science community had been thinking about how to solve the tragedy of over-exploitation under Hardin's model, a paradigm which resorts to national legislations or the price mechanism. The paradigm seemed to be shifted in 1990s: Ostrom proposed the 'CPR self-governance of User Groups' theory as another solution.This article started with the conflict of fisheries grounds of flying fish around the Orchid Island, a conflict that the author viewed as the CPRs dilemma. Then the author reexamined CPR self-governance theory and the indigenous institution of fisheries grounds around this island. On the basis of the principle of 'clearly defined boundary principle' proposed by Ostrom, it was found that an enduring self-governance fisheries ground institution could be impacted by the breaking of resources boundaries. In addition, solving this conflict, the government intervened with a new resource boundary which distinguished original and new users. However, the Public Trust Doctrine was not considered by the government.This case also showed that a cross-country or cross-boundary scale of CPR governance should be applied because the flying fish migrated to different places in different phases of their life cycle. Additionally, this case reflected that self-governance was not enough for solving the CPR dilemma. Therefore, it would be an important task in the future to develop such an approach, which accommodates Hardin's and Ostrom's solutions and applies suitable solutions by different scales of governance.

並列關鍵字

Traditional fisheries grounds in the Orchid Island ； CPR self-governance ； Public trust doctrine

參考文獻

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