本研究以談判理論為基礎,探討「後農業稅時代」中國大陸農村基層治理問題。在農村推行基層選舉的背景下,村民委員會選舉強化了村莊的自治能力;另一方面,取消農業稅雖然在某種程度上減輕了農民的負擔,但卻惡化了鄉鎮財政能力。兩種作用相互影響,使得村莊公共財的總供給未必增加,村莊治理也未必更加完善。因此,於相同議題的文獻中,便可能出現不同的實證結果。透過本文的模型分析發現,基層選舉與取消農業稅對於村莊公共財總供給的影響,取決於村莊的所得規模。經濟較富裕、鄉村工商業較發達的社區,即使稅費改革後來自鄉鎮政府的公共財投資下降,村莊公共財總供給也未必會減少;相反地,經濟貧困的社區,其公共財總供給則會因來自鄉鎮政府的公共財投資下降而陷入停滯。
The main purpose of this paper is to delve into the issue of village governance in the era of agriculture reform in rural China. We view village governance as a bargaining between villagers' committee and township government by virtue of Nash bargaining theory. The abrogation agriculture tax mitigates the burden upon Chinese farmers, but it exacerbates township government's public finance. Therefore, grass-roots democracy intensifies and enlarges villages' self-governance but it is not a necessary result to improve village governance due to the insufficient supply of local public goods. We indicate that the level of the supply of local public goods depends on the income of villages in the terms of our model. The rich village will attain much public investment than the poor counterpart even if they all confront the financial predicament descended from township government after the reform of agriculture tax.