政官菁英對和平主義規範與建制的挑戰：日本2013年〈防衛計畫大綱〉制定與內容

Political-Bureaucratic Elites' Challenges to Norms and Institutions of Pacifism: The Making and Content of Japan's 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines

郭育仁(Yu-jen Kuo)

《政治學報》 62期 (2016/12) Pp. 53-77

https://doi.org/10.6229/CPSR.2016.62.03

摘要

建構主義認為規範與概念等非物質變因大幅約制戰後日本防衛政策的發展，並強調和平主義規範與建制是造成戰後日本經濟與軍事實力巨大落差，以及冷戰後仍傾向緩步調整防衛政策的主因。然而政治菁英（首相、內閣、執政黨）與官僚菁英（防衛省、外務省）的政策主動性，使得近年日本國防改革開始出現與建構主義預測不同的發展。安倍晉三內閣於2013 年12 月17日通過〈防衛計畫大綱〉，政策制定過程中，政官菁英緊密分工合作，主動運用外在安全威脅創設「國家安全保障會議」以強化首相決策權、漸進挑戰高敏感性的國防議題、以及藉和平主義之名進行國防改革之實等三大策略，順利突破戰後和平主義規範與政治建制對首相權力與防衛政策的約制，同時在政策制定模式與政策內容產生重大改變。出現戰後日本史上為因應周邊局勢改變，最具軍事操作性的國防文件。本文聚焦在三個主要議題：第一、2013年〈防衛計畫大綱〉制定過程中，政官菁英如何運用政策主動性挑戰和平主義規範與建制。第二、政官菁英扮演的政策功能、互動與分工架構，以及整體政策制定模式。第三、上述制定模式如何影響最後政策內容。

關鍵字

日本防衛政策 ； 防衛計畫大綱 ； 建構主義 ； 政官分工 ； 現實主義

並列摘要

Constructivism argues that nonmaterial factors such as norms and ideas have largely constrained the development of postwar Japan’s defense policy, and emphasizes that the Pacifism norms and institutions are the main causes for the huge gap between Japan’s economic and military powers, and for the incremental defense adjustments in the post-Cold War era. However, Japanese political elites' policy activism has led to the contradiction between Japan's defense reform in recent years and the theoretical prediction of constructivism. The Abe Cabinet released Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on December 17, 2013. During the process, political (the prime minister, the cabinet, and ruling parties) and bureaucratic elites (foreign and defense ministries) utilized four major strategies in challenging the constraints from the norms and institutions of postwar Pacifism on prime ministers' power in defense reforms. The strategies include active propagation of external security threats in order to establish the National Security Council, better division of labor between the foreign and defense ministries, incremental challenge to the issues with high political sensitivities, and the resort to Pacifism in carrying out realistic defense reforms. These successful breakthroughs in the making of 2013 NDPG also resulted in the highest military operability defense document in postwar Japan in responding to the rapid changing security environment. This article will answer three major research questions: First, what are the strategies applied by the political-bureaucratic elites in actively challenging the constraints from the norms and institutions of postwar pacifism? Second, what are the political-bureaucratic elites' roles and functions in the making of 2013 NDPG, in terms of their policy interaction and division of labor? Third, what are the impacts of the aforementioned policymaking model on the final policy outcomes?

並列關鍵字

Japan's Defense Policy ； National Defense Program Guidelines ； Constructivism ； Labor of Division between Political and Bureaucratic Elites ； Realism

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