Who Actually Benefits from Proxy Contests?

誰能真正由委託書收購中獲利？

楊聲勇(Sheng-Yung Yang) ； Jeremy Goh ； 陳玉芬(Yu-Fen Chen) ； 駱美琪(Mei-Chi Lo)

《財務金融學刊》 24卷3期 (2016/09) Pp. 69-89

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2016.24(3).3

摘要

本文旨在探討不同公司治理結構下，委託書收購對股東財富之影響。研究結果證實，若公司治理制度愈民主，其股東愈能在委託書收購時獲得異常報酬。同時我們也發現，分析師亦傾向針對具民主公司治理機制的公司，在委託書收購時進行較佳的盈餘預測修正。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 委託書收購 ； 宣告效果 ； 分析師盈餘預測修正

並列摘要

This paper examines how proxy contests affect shareholder wealth as taking account of the firm's pre-existing corporate governance structure. The results indicate that only firms with the most democratic corporate governance structures benefit shareholders as a result of proxy contests. For firms with democratic corporate governance mechanisms, analysts tend to make greater-than-usual revisions in their one-year earnings forecast during proxy contests.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； proxy contests ； announcement effects ； analysts' earnings forecast revision

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