為何擁有減緩代理問題機制的公司會有高現金流量權槓桿？

Why Firms with Mechanisms for Agency Problem May Have High Cash Flow Right Leverage?

丁秀儀(Hsiu-I Ting) ； 王銘駿(Ming-Chun Wang) ； 吳皓猷(Hao-Yu Wu)

《證券市場發展季刊》 24卷3期 (2012/09) Pp. 101-140

https://doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.2012.24(3).4

摘要

本文旨在研究影響最終控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離的原因，探討當企業具有相對較佳的減緩代理問題機制時，私人利益與風險趨避假說是否可解釋現金流量權槓桿偏高的現象。以2003至2007年台灣曾上市櫃公司為樣本，結果發現負債比率、董事規模、獨立董監事、與機構投資人持股等減緩代理問題機制能有效降低現金流量權槓桿。當企業有相對較佳的減緩代理問題機制時，控制股東較不會因為風險趨避態度提高現金流量權槓桿，不過私人利益假說可用來解釋為何當企業存在相對較佳的減緩代理問題機制時，現金流量權槓桿依然有偏高的現象。

關鍵字

現金流量權槓桿 ； 減緩代理問題機制 ； 私人利益 ； 風險趨避

並列摘要

This paper focuses on the reasons for the separation of cash flow and control rights. We investigate whether private benefit hypothesis and risk aversion hypothesis can explain why firms with superior mechanisms for alleviating the agency problem have high cash flow right leverage. Our sample consists of Taiwan-listed firms over the period 2003-2007. We find that mechanisms for alleviating the agency problem, including debt ratio, board size, independent directors and supervisors, and institutional ownership, effectively reduce cash flow right leverage. When firms have superior mechanisms for alleviating the agency problem, controlling shareholders would not increase cash flow right leverage due to risk aversion. However, private benefit hypothesis can explain why firms with superior mechanisms for alleviating the agency problem still have high cash flow right leverage.

並列關鍵字

Cash Flow Right Leverage ； Mechanisms for Agency Problem ； Private Benefit ； Risk Aversion

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