論同情

A Discourse on the Sympathy

何泌章(Miz-Hang He) ； 夏代雲(Dai-Yun Xia)

《哲學與文化》 34卷7期 (2007/07) Pp. 145-153

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.200707.0145

摘要

同情是主體與客體－遭過不幸的人的情感共嗚，亞當•斯密對同情概念的發展是對同情倫理學的傑出貢獻，但並非對同情內涵的真正揭示。同情行為的產生是從同情主體與客體的地位的客觀差顯到主觀平等的過程。同情對主體而言是一種快樂而不是痛苦。現實中由於種種原因，我們苦於對遭遇不幸的人表示同情，也苦於對遭遇不幸的人表示不同情。因為同情這種美德能最終導致快樂總量的增加，所以她能積極地促進社會的和諧與進步。

關鍵字

同情 ； 內涵 ； 主客關係 ； 美德

並列摘要

Sympathy is a kind of fellow-feeling of the body and the object who is in trouble. Although Adam Smith gave a new meaning in his work ”The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, he did not show the right meaning of it. The course of sympathy is that the place of the body and the object changes from inequality objectively to equality subjectively. Sympathy for the body is a kind of happiness but not affliction. Now we are in the trouble of both showing sympathy to misfortune ones or not. As the virtue sympathy leads to the total of happiness added, it actively makes the society harmonious and accelerates it.

並列關鍵字

Sympathy ； Meaning ； Relations of the Body and Object ； Virtue