過去有關董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱D&O保險)之研究著重於D&O保險的需求、發展與未來展望。本文以台灣2007年至2012年之上市櫃公司為研究對象,探討D&O保險與公司資訊揭露的品質以及舞弊發生的可能性之關聯性。實證結果發現,相較於未投保D&O保險之公司,已投保D&O保險之公司,其資訊揭露品質較高且發生舞弊的可能性較低。此外,D&O保險之保險額度亦與資訊揭露品質呈現正向相關,而與舞弊發生的可能性呈負向關係。整體而言,本文結果支持公司投保D&O保險對董監事暨重要職員具有激勵誘因效果,不但能促使董監事審慎經營管理公司,以提升公司的資訊透明度,並且能抑制公司發生舞弊的可能性。
Most of the prior researches on the directors' and officers' (hereafter D&O ) liability insurance have concentrated on its demands, determinants, or developments in the future. The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between D&O liability insurance coverage and the information disclosure quality and the incidence of corporate fraud for firms publicly listed in Taiwan for the period from 2007 to 2012. The empirical results show that the companies with D&O liability insurance coverage have higher information disclosure quality and have lower probability of fraud occurrence than those of companies without D&O insurance. Besides, there is a positive relation between D&O insurance coverage limits and information disclosure quality and a negative relation between D&O insurance coverage limits and the incidence of corporate fraud. Overall, the empirical results generally support the incentive motivation effects of the D&O insurance coverage for the directors and officers. The D&O insurance coverage not only leads the directors and officers to act prudently to increase the corporate information transparency but also depresses the incidence of corporate fraud.
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