預售屋制度在近年來頗受市場之歡迎,但交易糾紛亦時有所聞,為了保障買方購買預售屋之權益,我國於2011年5月1日起正式強制實行預售屋履約保證制度,因此本文將履約保證制度導入Chan, Wang and Yang(2012)所提出的兩階段賽局模型,並欲探討在強制實行履約保證後,對於預售屋市場之影響及其價值為何,結果發現在滿足買方的違約選擇權無價值之條件下,不論建商選擇「價金返還之保證」、「同業連帶擔保」或「工會連帶擔保」作為履約保證之辦理方式,預售屋之均衡價格皆為房價之期望值,而履約保證之價值即為建商的放棄選擇權之價值在實行履約保證前後之差異。此外在滿足建商的放棄選擇權無價值的條件下,由於建商無誘因選擇停建,履約保證亦因此而無價值。
Presale housing system becomes popular in the market recently, but there still some arguments in the trading. To protect the right for the buyer buying the presale house, the government officially conducts the performance bond of presale house system on May, 2011. Thus, the study introduce this system into the two-stage game theory that proposed by Chan, Wang and Yang(2012) and investigate the impact and value of performance bond for presale housing market. We find under the condition that the value of buyer’s default option is zero, the equilibrium price of the presale house is the same as expected house price whether house contractor chooses “guarantee for price refund”, “jointly and severally liability of peer industries” or “jointly and severally guarantee from unions” as the way to take performance bond, and the value of performance bond is the difference between the value of house contractor’s abandonment option before and after taking performance bond. Additionally, under the condition that the value of house contractor’s abandonment option is zero, the house contractor has no incentive to stop the building project, and the performance bond has no value.