摘要
本研究主要目的為以實驗的方式來探究雙重邊際化 (double marginalization) 的問題，進行三十二場公開賣價拍賣市場實驗。本文研究大綱主要參照Durham (2000) 所提出之實驗，並以其實驗做為對照組進行比較。 在本實驗中與Durham不同的是實驗中並未加入紅利的補償，目的為探究紅利因素是否影響廠商的出價，故在本研究中，主要以兩種實驗處理來消除雙重邊際化的問題：（1）將下游的市場機制，從單一獨佔市場改為具有競爭性的三家廠商（2）將市場分為給予紅利與沒有給予紅利做為處理因子，紅利的處理因子與Durham為了彌補競爭型的下游廠商在競爭市場無法賺取利潤，而給予受試者的補償有相同的效果。 實驗結果以Durham所採用的檢定方式進行檢定，其檢定結果呈現無論在市場有無給予紅利、下游廠商的市場型態是否為獨占或是競爭，廠商在最後六回合確實能夠趨近於Durham文章中根據Spengler的理論所推導出之理論值，在這點與Durham的實驗結果是相同的。在下游市場為獨佔的情形下，無論市場是否給予紅利，皆會產生垂直外部性加價行為。在下游市場為競爭的情形下，無論市場是否給予紅利，確實能夠消除雙重邊際化之出價行為。在競爭性的下游廠商不會產生對於上游商的出價產生出價上的扭曲，在這點與Durham的研究是不同的。 在紅利因素對於廠商的出價影響，在下游市場為獨佔的情形下，市場給予紅紅利確實能夠抑制廠商的出價，但在下游市場為競爭的情形下，市場給予紅利，卻對於廠商的出價影響不顯著。此外從市場效率、消費者剩餘、銷售數量的檢定結果得知與Durham的檢定結果是相符合的。
並列摘要
The main purpose of this experiment is to explore the issue of double marginalization by thirty-two posted-offer experiments. The outline of this study is mainly with reference to the experiment proposed by Durham, which is considered as a control group for comparison. The difference between this experiment and Durham’s experiments is that this experiment does not add the bonus as compensation, in order to find whether the bonus factor affect the firm’s bid or not. Therefore, in this experiments , two experimental treatments are mainly used to eliminate the double marginalization. First, the downstream market mechanisms from a monopolistic market to a competitive market. Second, divided the market into two parts: with bonus and without bonus as experimental treatments. Bonus has the same effect as compensation in Durham’s experiment. The method of Hypothesis testing is the same as Durham’s method on this experiment. The results are presented whether bonus is given or not or whether market type of downstream is monopolistic or competitive, it is really close to the theoretical value that Durham deduced refer to Spengler’s theory in the last six periods, same as Durham’s experiments. When the market of downstream manufacturers is monopolistic, vertical mark-up behavior occurs no matter bonus is given or not. However, when the market of downstream firms is competitive, double marginalization would be eliminated no matter bonus is given or not. The downstream firms would not cause price distortion in the competitive market, which is different from the result of Durham’s experiments. Regarding the effect of the bonus mechanism for firm’s pricing, bonus mechanism can fully inhibit firm’s pricing in the monopolistic downstream market. But, bonus mechanism can’t inhibit firm’s pricing in the competitive downstream market. In addition, the test results of market efficiency, consumer surplus, and quantity are consistent with Durham's experiments.