客觀與主觀績效對中階經理人升遷之影響

The Impact of Objective Performance and Subjective Performance on the Promotion of Mid-level Managers

李伶珠(Ling-Chu Lee)

《管理學報》 30卷1期 (2013/02) Pp. 1-20

https://doi.org/10.6504/JOM.2013.30.01.01

摘要

本研究採用實證研究法，利用國內一家大型汽車公司所提供的資料，探討客觀與主觀績效對中階經理人升遷之影響。實證結果有二，第一，在升遷決策上，「彙總性客觀績效的排序」比「個別客觀績效勝出的幅度」更重要；第二，個別客觀績效並不會直接影響經理人之升遷，而是先經由客觀績效影響主觀績效，再由主觀績效影響經理人之升遷。實證結果意涵，經理人必須在相對客觀績效上優於同儕，才能獲得較高的主觀績效，並取得升遷候選人的門票。然而，客觀績效表現優異並非升遷的保證書，高階主管還會透過主觀績效，彙總考量客觀績效，並蒐集其他攸關資訊，進而決定經理人的升遷。

關鍵字

升遷誘因 ； 客觀績效 ； 主觀績效 ； 競賽理論

並列摘要

This paper employed field empirical study which utilized data provided by a large domestic automobile company to explore the impacts of objective and subjective performance evaluations on promotion decision for mid-level managers. Empirical results showed that the ordinal ranking of aggregate objective performance is more important than the exceeding magnitude of individual objective performance in promotion decisions. Although the individual objective performance has no direct impact on promotion decision, it truly shows significant effect on the subjective performance; rather subjective performance was the key to promotion. Empirical results revealed that manager must have superior objective performance over his/her colleagues, to achieve higher appraisal of subjective performance, and consequently becomes the candidate for promotion. But superior objective performance would not guarantee the promotion; supervisors make the promotion decision based on the subjective performance evaluation which covered the aggregate objective performance and the relevant information excluded in objective performance.

並列關鍵字

Promotion-Based Incentives ； Objective Performance ； Subjective Performance ； Tournament Theory

參考文獻

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