南方炫耀性商品之最適反仿冒率與進口關稅率

Optimal Counterfeit-captured Rate and Tariff Rate for Southern Flaunting Merchandise

楊維娟(Wei-Chuan Yang) ； 周登陽(Deng-Yang Chou) ； 鄭惠文(Hui-Wen Cheng)

《應用經濟論叢》 101期 (2017/06) Pp. 1-30

https://doi.org/10.3966/054696002017060101001

摘要

本文探討炫耀性商品的仿冒問題，由南方的角度出發，藉由垂直差異化模型，以分析最適進口關稅率、仿冒查獲比率及對社會福利的影響。主要發現如下：(一) 若仿冒查獲比率的邊際成本不過大，存在仿冒可能時，政府的最適查獲比率為可將仿冒品逐出市場的最低比率，故實際上並無仿冒品出現。(二) 潛在的仿冒可能性使最適進口關稅率降低，並惡化社會福利。(三) 仿冒品品質下降、品牌炫耀性上升、炫耀性的負外部性效果上升、正品廠商邊際成本下降或仿冒廠商邊際成本上升時，有、無仿冒可能下的最適關稅率差距擴大。

關鍵字

仿冒 ； 炫耀性商品 ； 關稅 ； 垂直差異化模型

並列摘要

This paper applies a vertical differentiation model to investigate the optimal import tariff, optimal counterfeit-captured rate, and the welfare effects in the presence of counterfeit of status goods from the viewpoint of southern side. Three major results are concluded. (1) Regardless of the detecting cost, the optimal counterfeit-captured rate equals to the minimum rate that could drive out the counterfeit. (2) When there is potential counterfeiting, the optimal import tariff and social welfare decrease. (3) In the cases of the quality of counterfeit declining, the status of brand-name products rising, the negative externality getting higher, the marginal cost of genuine firm reducing, or the marginal cost of counterfeiting firm increasing, the difference of the optimal tariff between counterfeiting and non-counterfeiting scenarios would be enlarged.

並列關鍵字

Counterfeiting ； Status Goods ； Tariff ； Vertical Differentiation Model

參考文獻

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