可靠性、知德、與識知證立的內在性

Reliability, Intellectual Virtues, and the Internal Dimension of Epistemic Justification

彭孟堯(Eric M. Peng)

《東吳哲學學報》 11期 (2005/02) Pp. 99-125

https://doi.org/10.29732/SJPS.200502.0003

摘要

本文試圖掌握「可靠性」、「知德」與「證立內在面」的關聯。我認為可靠論所要求的「證立的世界索引性」足以回應「後設不融貫難題」以及「新惡魔難題」，然而該學說終究走向了引入內在觀要素的知德知識論。這是由於該學說在回應兩大難題時，仍必須正視「證立」的內在面，而為了將此想法納入，最後還是有賴於將「知德」概念引進可靠論內。這是一個重大的轉折，相較於傳統知識論將「證立」視為「基於信念的」，知德知識論將「證立」視為「基於主體的」。傳統以來，「證立」是就「信念」來說的，但知德知識論則是從「知德」來說「證立」，而「知德」是認知主體的能力，主體的知性努力才是信念證立與否的關鍵。

關鍵字

可靠論 ； 知德知識論 ； 證立 ； 後設不融貫難題 ； 新惡魔論證

並列摘要

This essay was an attempt to understand the relationships between reliability, virtue, and the internal dimension of epistemic justification. I argued that the appeal to world indexicality of justification in several variants of Goldman's reliabilism should be adequate for solving the problem of meta-incoherence and the new evil demon problem. However, the externalist reliabilism finally moves to the internalism-oriented virtue epistemology. I argued that the main reason is that externalists cannot ignore the internalist insights brought about by the above two problems. This is a major turning point in epistemology, for traditionally justification is belief-based whilst virtue epistemology is subject-based.

並列關鍵字

reliabilism ； virtue epistemology ； justification ； new evil demon argument ； Sosa ； Goldman

參考文獻

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BonJour, L.,Kornblith (Ed.)(2001).Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism.Oxford:Blackwell.

Conee, E.,Feldman, R.(1998).The Generality Problem For Reliabilism.Philosophical Studies.89,1-29.

Cooper, N.(1994).The Intellectual Virtues.Philosophy.69,459-469.

Foley, R.,Villanueva, E. (Ed.)(1994).Truth and Rationality.Atascadero, CA:Ridgeview.