邁向一個整體論式的表述理論

Toward a Holistic Theory of Predication

鄧敦民(Duen-Min Deng)

指導教授 ： 楊金穆

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.00315

摘要

在本論文中，我提出對表述問題的一條新進路。我將表述問題重新界定為以下的兩個問題：（一）是何依據使得我們能單義地使用同一個述詞來表述不同事物？（二）是什麼能整合一個句子的各部份（通常為一名稱與一述詞），成為一個單一的表述，而非僅僅為字詞的表列？我們可以稱第一個問題所關心的為「分類的單一性」，第二個為「命題的單一性」；一個表述理論，便是對這兩個問題所提出的系統性回答。

前三章我將批評三種對表述問題的傳統進路：實在論、惟名論、以及概念論。實在論者解釋表述的方式，是去設置某些抽象的元目做為述詞的語義值，並試圖證明表述只不過是在個體與抽象元目之間的一種關係。我將特別討論殊質理論，尤其是培根(1995)新近的陳述與討論。在第二章，我把惟名論的進路描繪如下：他們試圖透過將我們所使用的語言，翻譯或重述為惟名論可接受的語言，作為表述的語言基礎。我將討論卡納普(1928)從感覺與料建構性質集的計劃，與費爾德(1980)惟名論化科學理論的計劃，將之應用在處理表述問題上的可能性。至於概念論的進路，我將追溯此傳統至康德對概念的超驗分析，與布倫坦諾的意向性，但我的重點會放在麥農的對象理論，和假裝理論，兩個理論上。我將論證，以上的三種進路都注定要失敗。

我把傳統進路失敗的原因分析為分裂的問題：它們皆試圖透過劃分來為表述放下基礎，並努力將表述的本質化約至此基礎上。因此它們無法認知到，在一個表述理論當中，有三個因素是不可或缺的：世界與世界中事物之排列、語言的邏輯結構、以及心靈做判斷的能力。根據這樣的分析，我提出了一條新的進路──整體論式的進路，即，一個將這三個重要因素結合在一起的統一理論。我注意到蒯因和戴維森的整體論計劃，恰好足夠成為這樣一條進路的背景，因此我在第四章中將發展並應用他們的計劃來解釋表述。我的結論是：整體論式的進路，是惟一能夠對表述問題給出另人滿意的解釋之進路。

關鍵字

表述 ； 實在論 ； 惟名論 ； 概念論 ； 整體論 ； 共相 ； 殊質 ； 費爾德 ； 麥農 ； 假裝理論 ； 蒯因 ； 戴維森

並列摘要

In this thesis I present what I believe to be a new approach to the problem of predication. I shall reformulate the problem of predication as the following two questions: (1) What justifies our univocal use of one and the same predicate expression to predicate of several different things? (2) What unifies the parts of a sentence, usually a name with a predicate, to make a single predication rather than a mere list of words? Let us call what the first question concerns “the unity of classification,” and the second “the unity of the proposition”; a theory of predication, then, is a systematic account to answer such two questions.

In the first three chapters, I provide a critical review of three traditional approaches to predication in turn: the realist, the nominalist, and the conceptualist approach. The realist approaches predication by positing abstract entities as the semantic values of predicates, attempting to show that predication is nothing but a relationship between an individual and an abstract entity. Special attention will be paid to the Trope theory, especially J. Bacon’s (1995) new formulation and discussion. In Chapter Two, I characterize the nominalist approach as one that explains predication by some way of translation or reformulation of the language in use into a “nominalistically acceptable language” as the linguistic foundation for predication. I discuss the possibility of applying Carnap’s (1928) project of constructing quality classes from sense-data, and H. Field’s (1980) nominalist program of nominalizing the scientific theory, to an account of predication. As for the conceptualist approach, I trace this tradition back to Kant’s transcendental analysis of concepts and Brentano’s intentionality thesis, but my focus will be on the Meinongian theory of object and the pretense theory. I shall argue that the three aforementioned approaches are all doomed to fail.

I analyze the failure of the traditional approaches as the cleavage problem: all of them attempt to lay some foundation for predication by making cleavages, and endeavor to reduce the nature of predication to such a foundation. They therefore fail to recognize that in a theory of predication, three factors are indispensable: the world with the arrangement of things in it, the logical structure of our language, and the mental faculty of the making judgments. Based on such an analysis, I propose a new approach to predication—the holistic approach, one which intends to combine the three important factors to yield a unified theory of predication. I notice that Quine and Davidson’s holistic programs happen to provide such a background sufficient for a full-scale theory of predication, which I shall work out in Chapter Four. I conclude that the holistic approach I advocate is the only possible approach that satisfactorily explains predication.

並列關鍵字

predication ； realism ； nominalism ； conceptualism ； holism ； universal ； trope ； H. Field ； Meinong ； pretense theory ； Quine ； Davidson

參考文獻

Bacon, J. 1995. Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Carnap, R. 1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Eng. Trans. by George, R. A. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chrudzimski, A. 1999. “Die Theorie der Intentionalität bei Franz Brentano.” Grazer Philosophischie Studien 57: 45-66.

Clark, R. 1978. “Not Every Object of Thought Has Being: A Paradox in Naïve Predication Theory.” Noûs 12: 181-88.

Clarke, F. P. 1962. “St. Thomas on “Universals”.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.59, No.23: 720-25.