The Problem of Predication and Quine's Solution

The problem of predication can be characterized as the problem that once plausible assignments of semantic roles have been made to the parts of sentences, the parts do not seem to compose a united whole. This problem has to do with the unification of a sentence or a proposition. It is not only a problem at the semantic level that deals with how predicates are related to names or other singular terms and contribute to the unity of a sentence, it is also a problem at the metaphysical level that concerns how universals are related to particulars and constitute a complex structural fact. This problem has its modern versions based on Bradley's problem, but it can also trace its traditional root back to the so-called ”third man problem” involved in Plato's theory of ideas. It is strongly felt that without solving this problem any theory of language, mind, and reality will always have a hidden riddle and lack a satisfactory explanation. A theory of predication should not be confused with a theory of predicates. A theory of predicates aims to provide semantics for all predicates, to explain the meaning and nature of predicates. But a theory of predication does more than that-the theory needs not only to explain the semantic role of predicates, but also to give a satisfactory account of how predicates can maintain their proper functions as parts of sentences while at the same time contribute to the unity of sentences in which they occur, the unity demanded by the fact that sentences can be true or false and can be used to express our judgments and thoughts. There are some desiderata, Davidson tries to argue, which are required for any satisfactory account of predication. I characterize these as the following four requirements: the requirement of truth orientation, the requirement of avoiding infinite regress, the requirement of generality without abstract entities, and the requirement of a clear conception of the logical form of sentences. Quine's description of predication, according to Davidson's understanding, is to contrast the roles of singular terms and general terms which jointly constitute predication. Quine speaks of singular terms as referring to objects, while general terms are true of any number of objects of which can be predicated by those terms. However, Davidson does not seem to think that Quine has provided a full account of the semantic role of predicates, and so does not think that Quine has solved the problem of predication. Davidson seems to think that the merit of Quine's view is at most negative: it fulfills only the requirement of avoiding infinite regress. I will argue in this paper that Davidson has underestimated Quine's contribution to the theory of predication. I believe that Quine does provide an account that at least fulfills all four requirements set up by Davidson. The source of Quine's responses to this issue should be found in his book Philosophy of Logic, rather than just Word and Object. If what I say is correct, then Quine does have a solution to the problem of predication.