九O年代起中國股票市場繼政府與銀行之後,成為解救國有企業「資金饑渴」的重要制度設計。十餘年來中國股票市場的上市公司數目、募集資金、總市值與成交金額等都不斷地擴大,然而,由於其一開始就帶有行政目的,使得其組成結構與運行機制充滿著政治的痕跡,其中龐大的「國有股」是所有問題的核心,而所衍生的「國有股減持」問題則是關鍵;另一方面,地方政府與企業幹部合謀將上市公司當成「提款機」的投機行為則使得原本即不完善的市場制度進一步扭曲。兩者的加總致使中國股市無法向更高形式升級,而形成一種「缺乏發展的增長」,此即本文所謂的「制度內捲化」。就此而言,中國股市的內捲化是路徑依賴與行動者策略選擇的結果。
Since the Chinese stock market emerged 12 years ago, the two official stock exchanges, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, have expanded rapidly. At present, the stock market is an important player in the Chinese economy. However, China’s securities market has been operating in a relatively closed environment while implementing a set of rules with strong Chinese characteristics. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as dominant forces in the stock market are facing many problems, including organizational form, financing channels, industrial regulations and corporate governance structure, especially the lower degree of market transparency and malpractices result from excessively large proportion of State shares. Therefore, to reduce State shares is critical for understanding Chinese stock market reform. It has created a developmental disaster I call “institutional involution” that is the antithesis of evolution and leads the market to systemic underdevelopment.