可以而不能－荀子論爲善過程中的意志自由問題

Capable but Unable-Xun Zi on the Freedom of Will in the Process of Doing Good

方旭東(Xu-Dong Fang)

《哲學與文化》 34卷12期 (2007/12) Pp. 55-68

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.200712.0055

摘要

荀子在討論為善問題時，對「可而不能」的現象做了探討。依荀子，人可以為而不為，是因為不肯為，亦即不願為。這裡已涉及道德行為中的意志或意願問題。在這一點上，荀子與亞里斯多德不無相似，不過，與後者不同的是，荀子理解的意志或意願已不完全是個體主動的自由的選擇，而帶有某種必然的意味。荀子又認為，人之所以想做好事，是因為性惡。這個觀點的提出是因為荀子相信：事物如果短缺什麼，就會自動尋求滿足。這個短缺理論讓人想到奧古斯丁對惡的解釋。然而，儘管二者都提到意志自由，但試圖解決的問題卻完全不同，且二者對缺乏的認識以及從中引出的結論也大相異趣。

關鍵字

可 ； 能 ； 意志自由 ； 性惡 ； 短缺理論

並列摘要

In the discussion of doing good, Xun Zi approached the phenomenon of ”being capable but unable to do something.” According to Xun Zi's doctrine, if one didn't do something that he or she was capable of doing, it was due to the fact that he or she was not willing to do it. Therefore, such a phenomenon was related to the will or willingness in a moral act. On this issue, Xun Zi was somewhat similar to Aristotle, but what differentiated him from Aristotle was: the will or willingness as Xun Zi understood it was not totally an individual's active and free choice but something more or less inevitable. Also, according to Xun Zi, one's wish to do good was indeed the result of the evilness of human nature, since Xun believed that one would automatically seek to make up for the things in shortage. This theory of shortage reminds us of Augustine's explanation of evil. Though both of them mentioned the freedom of will, Xun and Augustine were trying to resolve different problems. Moreover, they were drastically distinct in their understandings about shortage and in the conclusions they respectively made.

並列關鍵字

Capable ； Able ； Freedom of Will ； Evilness of Human Nature ； Theory of Shortage

參考文獻

Bernard Williams,(1981)。Moral Luck。Cambridge University Press。

Aristotle, W.D. Ross. (ed.)(1928).Metaphysica.Oxford:

奥古斯丁(1981)。西方哲學原著選讀。商務印書館。

奥古斯丁、周士良譯(1991)。懺悔錄。商務印書館。

王先謙。荀子集解。上海書店。