過渡與開端——從萊維納斯觀點探問《存在與時間》之此在與存有論意涵

萊維納斯在《上帝．死亡與時間》中指出，海德格的論點仍以存在為意義的根源，這樣的說法對於以從「存在」到「意義」之轉向為關鍵的現象學而言，除了證成胡塞爾認為海德格自《存在與時間》之後已不再是現象學家的說法，也意味著海德格環繞存在而出的對於意義的要求，無法提供在存在之外思考人之問題的可能性。胡塞爾的批評劃出海德格與現象學的差異，萊維納斯的批評則區分海德格與倫理的關係。在本論文中，我們將議題設定在萊維納斯對於海德格的詮釋上。除了嘗試探問視海德格思想為「必要的過渡」的萊維納斯對於海德格的詮釋是否合法？也試圖藉由萊維納斯的思想，重新反思海德格以此在為主體，提問存在意義的存有論與傳統存有論的關係。

關鍵字

此在；存在與時間；海德格；萊維納斯；倫理；存有論

並列摘要

In God, Death and Time Lévinas has pointed out that, Heidegger's thesis still originates from the significance of Being. Such statement for the phenomenology which is crucial to the transition from ＂Being＂ to ＂Significance＂, has designated that Heidegger was no longer a phenomenologist after Being and Time, besides, Heidegger's claim for the significance surrounded by Being could not provide any possibility of conceiving the question of human beings beyond Being. Husserl's critique has drawn up the difference between Heidegger and the phenomenology, and Lévinas' criticism has distinguished Heidegger from the ethics. In this thesis, we will dispose the discussion in Lévinas' explanation for Heidegger. Apart from attempting to investigate whether such explanation from Lévinas who has regarded Heidegger's thoughts as ＂a necessary transition＂ is legitimate or not, we will also try to rethink carefully the relation between the traditional ontology, and Heidegger's ontology which poses a question of the significance of ＂Being＂ from the subject of ＂Dasein＂.