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從任性角度解讀康德的自律思想

Interpreting Kant's Idea of Autonomy from Perspective of Choice

摘要


康德的自律通常從意志立法和任性執法兩個方面被理解,這種解讀雖然使人注意到了自律中立法以外的含義,但並沒有充分表現意志和任性的內在統一性,也不能揭示行動的主觀準則在道德立法中的真正意義。當代學者越來越重視自律中任性執法的個體性維度,這種研究視角揭示了康德自由觀中一條隱性的思維進路,即從人類現實具有的不完善任性到純粹意志的理念。自律的精神實質不僅在於理性對任性從上至下的道德立法,更在於任性視其自身的主觀準則為普遍法則。因此,任性執法的維度中自身就帶有立法的含義,這種立法體現在任性的成聖的自我提升中。因為自我提升的關鍵在於,這種不完善意志對一種有限的神聖存在者的仿效。後者充當了抽象的完善意志和人的主觀準則之間的第三者,並只能作為榜樣影響人的內心準則。

關鍵字

康德 自律 任性 準則 有限的神聖存在者 榜樣

並列摘要


Kant's idea of autonomy has always been interpreted from two aspects, lawgiving of pure will and executing of choice. Although the way of thinking reveals significance of autonomy beyond its faculty of lawgiving, it doesn't show any internal unity between the pure will and the choice, nor proves any genuine meaning of subjective maxim in lawgiving. Contemporary scholars pay more attention to individual dimension of the choice, and by so doing an implicit perspective of Kant's theory of freedom also emerges, i.e., from the actual faculty of choice to the idea of pure will. Spirit of Kant's idea of autonomy lies not just in the moral lawgiving of pure reason, but also in the subjective maxims which can be voluntarily taken as universal laws by human will. So, in the choice's own executing behaviors there is already the meaning of lawgiving which is embodied in its self-promotion to becoming holy. For the crux of the self-promotion consists in its following finite holy beings who act as the third thing between abstract perfect will and human subjective maxims, and can have effects on their inner maxims only as examples.

並列關鍵字

Kant Autonomy Choice Maxim Finite Holy Beings Example

參考文獻


Allison, Henry E.(1990).Kant's Theory of Freedom.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Timmermann, Jens(Ed.)(2009).Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, A Critical Guide.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, Paul(2007).Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, A Reader's Guide.London:Continuum.
Markovits, Julia(2010).Acting for the Right Reason.Philosophical Review.119,201-242.
Reath, Andrews(Ed.),Timmermann, Jens(Ed.)(2010).Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, A Critical Guide.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

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