韓元震對朝鮮朱子學未發論詮釋之省察

本論文之目的在於闡明韓元震之未發，並非如朱子學未發論般用以表現道德本性的形而上存在，而是心之知覺作用尚未受外部對象任何刺激之狀態的形而下存在。筆者將提出此主張的三條根據。其一，未發之氣稟不齊。其二，未發之明德因氣稟不齊而昏昧。其三，未發之虛靈知覺隨聖凡之不同而使其所知覺者分為理與欲。首先，氣稟依其字面之「氣」字而為形而下存在，因而可以說，與氣稟並論的未發不是形而上存在，而是尚未受外部對象任何刺激之狀態（形而下存在）。而且，若明德因氣稟不齊而昏昧，則並不能將知覺作用必然判定為善。最後，若未發之虛靈知覺隨聖凡之異而使其所知覺者分為理與欲，則即使是聖人，其成為道德性存在之根據亦不存在於其自身，而是存在於作為知覺之對象的外部狀況。

關鍵字

未發；形而上；形而下；氣稟不齊；虛靈知覺；明德；理；欲

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Han, Won-jin's Wei-fa (未發) is not like the Joseon Zhuzixue (朝鮮朱子學)'s definition of Wei-fa as Metaphysical existence (形而上), but represents the state of perception which has not yet received any stimulus from the external things belonging to physical part (形而下). I will present three grounds of such claims. The first one is Weifazhiqibingbuqi (未發之氣稟不齊). The second one is the impossibility of Weifazhimingde (未發之明德) belonging to Qi (氣) to make any universal moral reaction. The third one is about WeiFaZhiXulingZhiJue (未發之虛靈知覺) dividing into Li (理) or Yu (欲) according to whether the response is made by ordinary people or the saint. First of all, Qibing (氣稟) is literally Qi which is referred to as physical part (形而下). In addition, if Mingde (明德) belongs to Qi, its action will not be necessarily appropriate. Finally, if it is true that Xulingzhijue (虛靈知覺) is divided into Li or Yu according to whether the response is made by the saint or ordinary people, even in the case of the saint, the ground which allows him to be a moral being presents in the external events which are the objects of perception, not in their mind.