對哲學的與邏輯的反例外論的質疑

Against Anti-Exceptionism about Philosophy and about Logic

王文方(Wen-fang WANG)

《哲學與文化》 50卷2期 (2023/02) Pp. 43-60

摘要

哲學的反例外論認為哲學與科學在本質上並無不同，邏輯的反例外論則認為邏輯與科學在本質上也無不同。作者在本文中反對這兩個主張，並強調哲學理論選擇與邏輯理論選擇的IBE方法以及所使用的資料與科學的IBE方法以及所使用的資料只有表面的相似性，本質上其實相當不同。作者首先指出了哲學IBE方法論中的直覺資料與方法論本身的各種問題，然後藉著以下三個事實去進一步指出哲學IBE方法中的一個重大問題及其與科學IBE方法上的重大差別：（i）哲學IBE方法論預設了正確邏輯的選擇；（ii）正確邏輯的選擇本身也是一個哲學問題；以及（iii）哲學IBE方法無法合理而不偏頗地解決競爭中的邏輯理論或系統孰優孰劣的問題。

關鍵字

哲學反例外論 ； 邏輯反例外論 ； 最佳解釋推論 ； 哲學直覺

並列摘要

Anti-exceptionism about philosophy takes philosophy to be essentially the same as sciences, while anti-exceptionism about logic takes logic to be essentially the same as sciences. The author argues against both theses in this paper. The author argues, especially, that the IBE method used in philosophy and philosophy of logic to solve the selection problem among competing theories or among competing logic systems is only superficially similar to the IBE method used in sciences. In order to establish his claim, the author first points out several serious problems about the IBE method itself when it is used in philosophy and about the data that a philosophical theory is supposed to explain. He, then, argues that there is an even more serious problem in the IBE method used in philosophy which makes it very different from that used in sciences by pointing out three facts: (i) the use of the IBE method in philosophy presupposes that we have already determined the right logic system to be used in the IBE method; (ii) which logic system is the right logic system is, unfortunately, a philosophical issue; and (iii) the IBE method as it is used in philosophy, however, can't reasonably solve the problem of selecting the right logic system without bias.

並列關鍵字

Anti-exceptionism about Philosophy ； Anti-exceptionism about Logic ； Inference to the Best Explanation ； Philosophical Intuition

參考文獻

王文方，《形上學》，臺北：三民書局，2008。

王文方，〈哲學方法論的問題與哲學懷疑論〉，《中國社會科學報》，2022-04-12 A02，https://epaper.csstoday.net/mepaper/mobile/paper/story?pubCode=zgshkxb&pubDate=2022-04-12&pageTitle=A02&ddd=s_6f0da44935c76ec0cd353de8f12595bc60a350f8acae3084ae01e4f72540a7b3&link=a8d9bd9d8fcc4c06a7bd61b12dd71cb07e60d14a（檢索於 2022 年 9 月 14 日）。

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