論瑣碎性結果與對條件化的限制

On the Triviality Results and the Restriction on Conditionalization

蘇慶輝(Ching-Hui Su)

《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》 41期 (2011/03) Pp. 113-133

https://doi.org/10.6276/NTUPR.2011.03.(41).04

摘要

路易士的「瑣碎性結果」論證被視為能有力地拒斥對於條件句採行的真值條件語意論，因為如果接受古典的機率理論、條件化，以及史東內克對條件句的論點，我們可以推導出一個荒謬的結果－對任意的命題A與C而言，p(C/A)=p(C)。本文試圖回應他的「瑣碎性結果」論證，並指出：無論我們以條件機率如何定義自然語言的任何二位連接詞，瑣碎性結果仍會出現。因此，放棄史東內克對條件句的論點不是避開瑣碎性結果的唯一方式；相反的，我們可以對「條件化」做適當的限制來避免瑣碎性結果。

關鍵字

條件句 ； 瑣碎性結果 ； 路易士 ； 史東內克 ； 條件化

並列摘要

Lewis's arguments for the triviality results are considered as a powerful rejection of the truth-conditional accounts of conditionals: the absurd consequence that for any propositions A and C, p(C/A)=p(C) is derived from the classical probability calculus, conditionalization, and Stalnaker's semantics for conditionals. In this paper, it is argued that the triviality results need not be a threat to Stalnaker's semantics, for we can derive a generalized triviality result from the classical probability theory and any thesis about conditional probability. The lesson, I suggest, is that we should reconsider the classical probability theory or set a restriction on the rule of conditionalization such that the triviality results may be avoided.

並列關鍵字

conditionals ； triviality results ； Lewis ； Stalnaker ； conditionalization

參考文獻

Adams, E. W.(1965).On the Logic of Conditionals.Inquiry.8,166-197.

Adams, E. W.(1975).The Logic of Conditionals.Dordrecht:Reidel.

Bennett, Jonathan(2003).A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Oxford:Clarendon Press.

Carlstrom, Ian F.,Hill, Christopher(1978).Review of Adams's The Logic of Conditionals.Philosophy of Science.45,155-158.

Causey, Robert L.(2006).Logic, Sets, and Recursion.Boston:Jones and Bartlett Publishers.