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民主轉型與金錢政治的法律因應

Democratic Transition and Regulatory Underpinnings of Money Politics

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摘要


歷經了四十多年的威權統治,原本是屬於黨國威權體制下的黑金政治問題,隨著民主轉型而多元化。隨著中央國會的全面改選,企業與政治勢力逐漸進駐國會,人民選舉民意代表的「代理成本」(agency cost)隨著社會多元化反而逐漸提高。相對的,對於金錢政治的處理,也逐漸朝向多元化發展。 本文從管制理論的方法出發,將金錢政治的管制態樣分為政治迴避與預防、政治競爭、行為規範、財產公開以及政治責任等五大面向。傳統從外圍的責任與迴避來對金錢政治進行規範。隨著政治自由化,財產公開的管制,也逐漸受到重視。行為規範與政治競爭程序,則是最後發展的面向。未來我們對於金錢政治的管制,自應強化此兩大領域的建制。 本文認為,公務人員(或政治人物)在進入政治場域時,無論是在進入之前、進入後或是離開之後,法制上都必須有一套完整的規範以防弊。這不僅僅是要對於公務人員的行為有所規範,也希望藉此一透明機制,讓公務人員知所依循。

並列摘要


While Taiwan transformed successfully from authoritarian rule to democracy, the problems of money politics have not been resolved but, instead, become even more complex and multifaceted. Special interests have captured national politics with open elections of representative bodies. ”Agency cost” between people and their representatives, which would decrease in democracy, nevertheless increase with Taiwan's democratization and its society becoming diverse. As a consequence, in the post-hegemonic era, the regulatory underpinnings of money politics must be tackled with more diverse and dynamic directions. This paper argues that money politics regulations are divided into five types: rules of prevention, rules of competition, behavioral rules, sunshine rules and rules of accountability. The traditional focus of money politics regulations has been placed upon the rules of prevention and accountability. With the development of political liberalization and democratization, sunshine rules have gradually gained much attention. Both rules of competition and behavioral rules, however, are important strategies that we must put an acute emphasis on now, as we look forward political development. The author also suggests that effective regulations on official behaviors extend before the entry and after the exit of public officials. This serves not only the comprehensive cycle of behavioral rules for public officials but also, more importantly, provides a set of transparent rules for them to follow.

參考文獻


謝立功(2002)。掃除黑金的新思維-防制洗錢。中央警察大學學報。39
趙永清(1996)。健全陽光法案體系 導正社會黑金亂象-從公職人員利益衝突迴避原則談起。公務人員月刊。5
林山田(2001)。論權貴犯罪-黨政商勾結的結構性犯罪。台灣本土法學雜誌。18
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Adrian Furnham、Michael Argyle、許晉福譯。Psychology of Money。台北:弘智出版社。

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