「促進民間參與公共建設法」賦予民間機構辦理區段徵收開發業務等機制,期待運用市場治理模式提昇開發收益,實現公共建設外部效益內部化。惟區段徵收開發效益取決於開發規模及代理人努力效果等因素,在政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱下,恐於招商階段隱藏逆向選擇問題,以及於執行階段發生道德危機問題。本文旨在探討民間參與捷運導向之區段徵收開發規模,引入制度經濟分析的理論框架中,並運用邏輯演繹推理方式,規範性地建構前瞻預測的委託代理模型,以使公私雙方能合理決定開發規模。本文假設案例發現,在區段徵收開發規模富有彈性下,對於民間機構欲藉由擴大開發規模而取得較大淨收益,以增加隱藏保留收益或降低必要努力的程度,是可達到預期效果。
”The Promoting Private Participation in Public Construction Act in Taiwan” provides a mechanism for the private sector to implement zone expropriation. It is expected that external benefits can be achieved through market forces. However, external benefits depend on the scale of development and effect of the agent's efforts. While the information asymmetry exists, adverse selection and moral hazard may occur. This study attempts to analyze the scale of zone expropriation in a transit station co-sponsored by private organizations, which establishes a principal-agent model based on the institutional economic analysis. Case simulation found that elasticity exists in the scale of development of zone expropriation. The analytical results indicate that increasing hidden utilities or decreasing the efforts would enable the private entity to increase profits by extending the scale of development.