政治獻金限額與關稅遊說

Political Contribution Caps and Lobbying for Tariff

王智賢(Jue-Shyan Wang) ； 蔡坤良(Kuen-Liang Tsai)

《經濟研究》 41卷2期 (2005/07) Pp. 207-247

https://doi.org/10.29765/TEI.200507.0002

摘要

本文主要探討面對政治獻金限額時，利益團體的政治獻金及關稅提案價格如何改變，以及社會福利是否真能獲得改善，以達到訂定政治獻金限額的目的。我們發現政治獻金限額的制定，大部分的情況下確實能夠達到改善社會福利的目標，唯有當原先得標之部門所提的政治獻金較低時，也就是原先得標部門所提之價格能夠比原輸標之一方所提之價格帶來更高的福利時，若出現原輸標的部門逆轉得標的情況時，社會福利反而會有惡化的可能。

關鍵字

遊說 ； 關稅 ； 政治獻金限額

並列摘要

This paper analyzes how interest groups alter their contributions and proposal price of tariff when facing the political contribution caps. We study the change in the social welfare when setting political contribution caps are set. It is found that setting the political contribution caps can achive the goal of improving the social welfare in most situations. However, when the contributions of the group originally winning the bidding are lower, the social welfare could be worsening if the group originally losing the bidding wins the bidding.

並列關鍵字

Lobby ； Tariff ； Political Contribution Caps

參考文獻

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NBER Working Paper

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