貪污,公共建設與經濟成長

Corruption, Infrastructure and Economic Growth

詹朝豐(Chao-Feng Chan)

指導教授 ： 盧佳慧

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/碩士(2010年)

摘要

貪污並不是一個嶄新的現象;時至今日,依舊有許多學者專家從事相關問題的研究。
近年來,不少的實證研究支持政府的財政政策對經濟成長有顯著的貢獻,然而貪污的存在卻會扭曲政府的基本功能。
這讓我們不禁想問,貪污究竟是否會對經濟成長產生衝擊?不僅如此,在貪污的議題上,始終存在著一個相當大的爭議點:貪污究竟是有助於經濟成長抑或是對經濟環境產生危害?

基於以上,本文嘗試建立一個具有貪污存在的公部門外部性內生成長模型,同時衡量貪污的負面以及正面影響效果,並且亦不同於以往分析貪污行為的經濟成長模型,
本文率先考量政黨在政府部門中所扮演的重要角色,將其納入模型之中。我們發現,縱使貪污的正面影響效果存在於經濟體系之中,然而政黨的競租行為才是貪污問題的核心。
如同標準的委託人 - 代理人問題,政黨真正的目的是永續執政,唯有透過掌握政府運作、獨佔公部門資源,才能從中獲取大部分的利益;
再者,政黨將這些資源耗損在如競選等非生產行為上,因而讓長期經濟成長率下降。
最後,本文認為適度的設立查緝貪污的機制,是可以有效解決政黨貪腐的問題。

關鍵字

經濟成長 ； 政黨 ； 貪污 ； 外部性

並列摘要

Corruption is not a new phenomenon.
There exists a record about the first corrupt official in China back in 500 B.C.
Today, there are still scholars devotes themselves to researching related issues.
Recently, some empirical evidences show that the support of the fiscal policy of governments is strong related to the economic growth,
though the existance of corruption would twist the basic function of governments.
And the findings make us can't help thinking whether or not the corruption would have any effect on economic growth?

Based on above, an externalities endogenous growth model of public sector with corruption is estabilished, examining both of the positive and negative effects of corruption as well.
Not like the existed economic growth model analyzing corruption, the important role as political party plays is consiered and also brought into the model.
It turns out that though the positive effects exist in the economic system, the rent-seeking in the political party is the core of corruption.
As normal principal - agent problem, the final objective of a political party is to be in power, through which,
the political party could have the full control over the government and the resources of the public sector, then could grab most of the benefit from it.
Morevevr, political partys waste the resource on the non-productive activities such as running in an election, which could lead to the downturn of the long term economic growth rate.
Finally, it is to be of the opinion that establishinging the anti-corruption system appropriatly could solve the corruption problem in political parties effectively.

並列關鍵字

economic growth ； party ； corruption ； externality

參考文獻

王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005), "政治獻金限額與關稅遊說", 《經濟研究》(Taipei Economic Inquiry), 41(2), 207-247。

Barreto, Rual A. (2000), "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model", European Economic Review, 44(1),35-60。

Barro, Robert J. (1990), "Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth", The Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S103-S125。

Del Monte, Alfredo and Erasmo Papagni (2001), "Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of Italy", European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 1-16。

Ehrlich, Isaac and Francis T. Lui (1999), "Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth", The Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), S270-S293。