Vertical Separation and Collusion

垂直分割與勾結

高國峯(Kuo-Feng Kao) ； 陳金盛(Chin-Sheng Chen)

《經濟研究》 56卷2期 (2020/07) Pp. 243-266

摘要

This paper examines an integrated firm's incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.

關鍵字

Vertical Separation ； Trigger Strategy ； Collusion

並列摘要

本文探討當廠商的行為具前瞻性時，整合廠商從事垂直分割的誘因。利用一無限期重複賽局，我們發現相較於垂直整合，最終財市場的勾結在垂直分割的市場結構下較容易達成。當廠商的折現因子適中且中間財價格夠低時，此整合廠商將進行垂直分割。此外，如中間財價格的提高能有效阻止廠商進行垂直分割，則社會福利將隨中間財價格上升而增加。

並列關鍵字

垂直分割 ； 觸發策略 ； 勾結

參考文獻

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