The unique characteristic of the Fourth Merger Wave plays a significant role in hostile mergers. Firms that become targets of a hostile bid need to resist actively their raiders. For these targeted firms, seeking a friendly bidder or a white knight is an alternative approach to hostile acquirer attacks. However, it is uncertain if this move corresponds to the ”shareholder interest hypothesis” or the ”management entrenchment hypothesis.” This paper examines these two competing hypotheses by analyzing data gathered from 323 global events of successful hostile takeovers covering the period 1980-2007, the focus of which is on the utilization of white knights against hostile takeovers. The collected sample is divided into three case groups: successful white knights, successful hostile bidders competing with white knights, and successful hostile bidders without white knights. Results show that the managerial entrenchment hypothesis is more appropriate compared with the shareholder interest hypothesis. From a conceptual perspective, this suggests that dealings can benefit target firms. Nevertheless, the results may also be insignificant.