從代理理論觀點探討家族企業之股票買回行爲

Share Repurchase Activities in Family Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective

洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung) ； 陳怡珮(Yi-Pei Chen) ； 許凱婷(Kai-Ting Hsu)

《臺大管理論叢》 21卷1期 (2010/12) Pp. 171-203

https://doi.org/10.6226/NTURM2010.21.1.171

摘要

本文從代理理論觀點探討家族企業特性、家族成員隸屬以及內部制衡機制對企業股票買回政策之影響。實證結果發現：相較於非家族企業，家族企業較不會進行股票買回活動；家族企業中，偏離程度與股票買回活動之可能性呈現倒U型非線性關係，此可能為傳統代理問題與大小股東間代理問題兩者抵換之結果，故家族與非家族企業可能因股權偏離程度以及上述代理問題之嚴重性等，調整股票買回政策。此外，家族CEO以及董事長兼任CEO皆會利用股票買回活動可改變股權結構之特性，增加對公司經營之控制權。因此，在控制股東涉入經營下，股票買回政策較不能作為監督經理人之機制，符合管理據守效果。在制衡機制方面，家族企業之外部董事能發揮監督公司之效。

關鍵字

股票買回 ； 家族企業 ； 代理理論

並列摘要

We investigate the effects of the characteristics of family firms and the mechanisms of corporate governance on the share repurchase activities of such firms. The results indicate that there is a higher likelihood that shares will be repurchased in family firms than in non-family firms. The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has an inverted u-shaped relationship with the likelihood of share repurchases in family firms, implying a tradeoff between type Ⅰ and type Ⅱ agency problems. We find that both family and non-family firms adjust their share repurchase programs in response to the degree of the divergence and the variety of agency problems. In addition, the presence of a family CEO and of that CEO also serving as chairperson of the board of directors in a family firm is positively related to the likelihood of share repurchasing. Outside directors provide superior monitoring of family firms.

並列關鍵字

share repurchases ； family business ； agency theory

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