資訊透明度對於執行長之薪酬合約中績效指標權重之影響：以美國上市、上櫃公司為樣本

The Effect of Information Opacity on the Weighting of Performance Measures in the Compensation Contracts of CEOs: Evidence from U.S. Firms

王泰昌(Tay-Chang Wang) ； 劉嘉雯(Chia-Wen Liu) ； 陳良軒(Liang-Shiuan Chen)

《臺大管理論叢》 32卷3期 (2022/12) Pp. 1-34

https://doi.org/10.6226/NTUMR.202212_32(3).0001

摘要

本研究探討資訊透明度對於執行長之薪酬合約中會計基礎績效指標及股份基礎績效指標權重之影響。首先，本研究以公司股票之買賣價差衡量公司股票相關資訊透明度，發現當公司股票之買賣價差愈大時，薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著提升，放置於股份基礎績效指標之權重顯著下降。此外，本研究亦以針對公司股票進行分析之分析師個數多寡衡量公司股票相關資訊透明度，發現當分析師個數愈多時，薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著降低，放置於股份基礎績效指標之權重顯著上升。另一方面，本研究以財務報表資訊品質衡量公司財務相關資訊透明度，並以裁決性應計數之絕對值衡量財務報表資訊品質。本研究發現，當裁決性應計數之絕對值愈大時，薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著降低，放置於股份基礎績效指標之權重則未有顯著變化。另外，考量產業特性進行迴歸分析，發現不同產業之產業特性差異，並未對薪酬合約中之會計基礎績效指標及股份基礎績效指標之權重產生顯著影響。

關鍵字

薪酬合約 ； 資訊透明度 ； 會計基礎績效指標 ； 股份基礎績效指標

並列摘要

This study examines the effect of information opacity of accounting numbers and stock-related information on the weighting of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures in CEOs' compensation contracts. For stock-related information opacity, we find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly increases and that the weighting of the stock-based performance measure significantly decreases if the bid-ask spread of the stock increases. In addition, we find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly decreases and that the weighting of the stock-based performance measure significantly increases if the number of analysts of a corporation increases. For information opacity of accounting numbers, we find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly decreases if the quality of the information of financial statements worsens. However, the weighting of the stock-based performance measure does not increase significantly simultaneously. Lastly, we take industrial difference into account and find that different business models across industries do not result in significantly higher or lower weightings of performance measures.

並列關鍵字

compensation contracts ； information opacity ； accounting-based performance measures ； stock-based performance measures

參考文獻

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