鄧小平在「高饒事件」中之角色與作爲

「高饒事件」是中共建政後黨內高層發生的第一起政治清洗。鄧小平親身經歷此事件，晚年更以證人的身分對之評論並簡略說明他個人在其中的角色與作用。鄧的相關講話經刻意刪改後，收入《鄧小平文選》，成爲中共官方迄今爲止對「高饒事件」的標準說法。針對鄧小平在「高饒事件」中之角色與作爲的問題，中國大陸的相關研究只能千篇一律地轉述《鄧小平文選》中的有關內容；西方的研究雖無須鸚鵡學語，但囿於資料的限制也無得深入。本文利用近年陸續出版與面世的資料與文獻，再輔以訪談，試以對鄧小平對「高饒事件」的具體介入情形與實質發揮作用，作一細節的實證研究。本文認爲：高崗上調中央工作後即爲毛澤東所特別器重，鄧小平對此過程知之甚詳，對高自也不敢小覦。毛澤東爲推行其「過渡時期總路線」的主張，也有意讓高崗、饒漱石作爲開路的鋒將，針對黨內思想較爲滯後的領導人如劉少奇等施加壓力；然而，每當相關政治施壓流於過度而使問題失焦之時，毛皆要鄧小平協助將之導正，鄧在此過程中也形成並確認毛重視維繫黨內高層團結的認知。與此同時，在政治上得志一時的高崗，其行徑張揚而有失謹慎，甚至出現明顯的偏差，如此已讓毛澤東感到忌憚，高崗有違紀律地遊說鄧小平以改變劉少奇地位的舉動，更成爲鄧向毛告發高行爲不法的口實，以及毛必須對高崗錯誤予以明快處置的重要原因。在毛澤東將高、饒問題加以定性且認定有罪後，鄧小平的任務就是在程序上展開並完成對兩人罪行的調查與認證。鄧小平在「高饒事件」中因準確判讀毛澤東的心思與需要，其權力地位大爲躍升；鄧迥異於高崗而表現得執中不偏，也博得多方的肯定。本文的討論，除對中共相關政治史的研究有所裨益，也有助於增進對鄧小平若干政治人格特質的瞭解，例如：能機敏掌握上者心意與動向，並機警調整態度以對；擅於緊抓問題要害，更敢於果斷速決、冒險行動；對於自身的政治對立面，重手處理而不手軟：對於自己深度涉入的政治與歷史爭議，則有自我袒護的傾向。

關鍵字

鄧小平；高饒事件；毛澤東；中共菁英政治；中共黨史

並列摘要

The Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Incident was the first political purge in Chinese elite politics since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping, then a vice-premier, was deeply involved in this political struggle. Regarding the role and activities of Deng in this political affair, Chinese-language publications published in Mainland China dealt with the issue according to Deng's related statement which actually had been officially selected and was an incomplete account of the incident. Western publications have long noted Deng's important role in the political purge. However, given the limitations of materials and informatim, there has been no detailed empirical study related to the issue. Based on newly available materials and recent interviews, this study demonstrates the following: to promote and facilitate his political initiative, the general line for the transition from New Democracy to socialism, Mao Zhedong, on the one hand, explicitly or implicitly urged State Planning Commission Chairman Gao Gang and Minister of Organization Department of CCP Rao Shushi to heavily pressure other leaders. especially Liu Shaocjui and his following, into accepting Mao’s related policy. On the other hand, Mac) asked Deng to play a role which was to ease the political tension and confrontation caused by Gao and Rao, and promote party unity and consolidation. During the above political process, Deng himself gradually believed and formed the perception that Mao cared about party unity and stability more than other political goals. The Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Incident was the first political purge in Chinese elite politics since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping, then a vice-premier, was deeply involved in this political struggle. Regarding the role and activities of Deng in this political affair, Chinese-language publications published in Mainland China dealt with the issue according to Deng's related statement which actually had been officially selected and was an incomplete account of the incident. Western publications have long noted Deng's important role in the political purge. However, given the limitations of materials and informatim, there has been no detailed empirical study related to the issue. Based on newly available materials and recent interviews, this study demonstrates the following: to promote and facilitate his political initiative, the general line for the transition from New Democracy to socialism, Mao Zhedong, on the one hand, explicitly or implicitly urged State Planning Commission Chairman Gao Gang and Minister of Organization Department of CCP Rao Shushi to heavily pressure other leaders. especially Liu Shaocjui and his following, into accepting Mao’s related policy. On the other hand, Mac) asked Deng to play a role which was to ease the political tension and confrontation caused by Gao and Rao, and promote party unity and consolidation. During the above political process, Deng himself gradually believed and formed the perception that Mao cared about party unity and stability more than other political goals. When Mao was already disappointed with some of Gao's impetuous political behaviors and started to doubt Gao's loyalty to him, Deng acted as the crucial informer letting Mao know of Gao's secret lobbying efforts aimed at changing Liu's political status as Mao's successor. In order to show his dispassionate fairness and prevent divulgence of his own deep involvement in some of Gao's secret political plots against Liu, Mao, who might have had a much closer personal relationship with Gao and more sympathy for Gao's political views and ideological orientation, had no choice but to decide to rapidly handle and punish Gao's illegal acts and activities. Mao delegated Deng and other leaders to investigate the so-called ”anti-party activities” of Gao and Rao, and harshly conduct a struggle against these two political figures who had lost the grace of the Supreme Leader. Deng strove to please Mao and meet his expectations. Unsurprisingly, Deng finally replaced Gao as Mao's favorite and consequently was the largest beneficiary of the political incident. This study also enhances the understanding of the patterns of Deng's special political behavior and attitudes which repeatedly appeared in the rest of Deng's political life and had much influence on Chinese politics.