摘要
To properly adjudicate a case characterized by technical details, a judge needs to spend considerable effort and resources to understand the relevant knowledge and evidence. Incorporating this element into a litigation model, private incentives in evidence collection are shown to be increasing in a judge's effort to process information. Diverting limited judicial resources to collect information, then, may generate multiple equilibria with different resource allocations. An equilibrium with more judicial resources devoted to information collection is accompanied with fewer resources for understanding, and thus lower private search effort. Unless the search capacity of the court is sufficiently high, public search will reduce the overall quality of judicial decision making. The model is also extended to consider whether a judge should disclose his ＂inner conviction＂ (心證), captured as the interim belief, before litigants present their evidence to the court. Disclosure is socially optimal under a general sufficient condition, namely, the first-order effect of the belief on private search dominates the second-order effect.
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