立法委員分配政治行爲分析：選區企業與立法委員企業背景的影響

Pork-Barrel Behavior of Legislators: Business Lobby and Business Connection of Legislators within Electoral Districts

羅清俊(Ching-Jyuhn Luor) ； 張皖萍(Wan-Ping Chang)

《政治科學論叢》 35期 (2008/03) Pp. 47-94

https://doi.org/10.6166/TJPS.35(47-94)

摘要

本文以分配理論爲基礎，觀察立法委員在第二屆第五會期通過的「修正勞工保險條例部分條文」與第四屆第一會期通過的「修正營業稅法部分條文」這兩個與企業利益相關的法案審議過程之發言紀錄與表決立場；以及第三至第五屆區域立委的企業利益提案行爲，是否會受到立委所屬選區的「企業」與「自身企業背景」因素的影響？本文首先分析這兩個法案審議過程的內容，然後透過邏輯斯迴歸模型分析這兩個法案的記名表決記錄。最後使用波松迴歸模型（或負二項迴歸模型）分析企業利益提案行爲。 首先，在法案內容的分析部分，無論「修正勞工保險條例部分條文」或是「修正營業稅法部分條文」的審議過程，雖然可以看出政黨立場明顯的差異，但是有限的立委發言記錄無法獲知其他可能影響立委發言的因素。但是，在上述兩個法案記名表決統計分析部分，本文發現法案中的三筆記名表決即使在政黨立場顯著差異的情況下，具有企業（或金融）背景身份的立委仍然會積極爭取與企業相關的政策利益。不過，在這三筆表決的統計分析當中，並沒有呈現選區企業對於立委表決態度的顯著影響。 其次，在提案統計分析的部分，從各屆次的個別分析來看，統計結果並未發現「立委企業背景」與「選區企業」對於立委企業利益提案數量的正向且顯著影響。在其他影響因素方面，第三、四、五屆有地方民選公職背景的立委均不積極多提出有利於企業的提案；第三屆立委參加肉桶委員會的次數越多，他們在企業利益的提案行爲也會越踴躍；而第五屆資深立委並不熱衷於企業利益的提案行爲。 本文透過次級資料分析，提供台灣分配政策與政治研究另外一種思考的面向。有別於傳統的分配政策研究，本文深入分析「立委企業背景」與「選區企業」變項對於「立委爭取企業利益的代表行爲」的影響，嘗試瞭解立委爭取企業利益背後的驅使力，並且提供未來台灣分配政治研究的實證基礎。

關鍵字

分配政治 ； 立法院 ； 肉桶政治 ； 企業利益

並列摘要

This paper explores the motives of legislators seeking policy benefits for businesses around their districts, analyzed from the perspective of distributive theories. The authors observe bill-initiation behavior of legislators from the 3(superscript rd) to 5(superscript th) Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. In addition, the markup records and roll call votes under the deliberation processes of two business-related bills are also investigated. These two bills are ”The Amendment of Labor Insurance Act” and ”The Amendment of Sale Tax Act”, which were passed in the 2(superscript nd) and 4(superscript th) Legislative Yuan respectively. Through this analysis, the authors try to answer whether or not legislative behavior is affected either by the business around their districts or by the business background of legislators themselves.
The authors are not able to see specific factors contributing to legislators' behavior from the limited markup records of the two bills under investigation alone, besides party affiliation. Yet statistical analysis of roll-call-votes on these two bills shows that ruling party members, legislators with business backgrounds, legislators with standing committee memberships, senior legislators, and legislators who once served as local elected officers tend to favor the policy interests of businesses.
The analyses of bill-initiation, Poisson regression and Negative Binomial analysis do not show any significant influence from ”businesses in and around the districts” on the initiation of business-related bills; nor from the ”legislators' business backgrounds”. This is true in the respective terms of the 3(superscript rd), 4(superscript th), and 5(superscript th) Legislative Yuan. However, other factors still play important roles in explaining the bill-initiation behavior of legislators favoring businesses.
In sum, this paper does not find that businesses around voter districts nor legislators' business backgrounds effect bill-initiation behavior. However, this paper does find that legislators' business backgrounds have a significant impact on business-related roll call votes. Theses findings have some implications for distributive politics in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

Distributive Politics ； Legislative Yuan ； Pork Barrel ； Business-Related Benefits

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