應用社會選擇機制於環境治理之實驗研究

Application of Social Choice Mechanisms to Environmental Governance: An Experimental Approach

賴世剛(Shih-Kung Lai) ； 張慧英(Hui-Ying Chang)

《規劃學報》 34期 (2007/12) Pp. 1-27

https://doi.org/10.6404/JP.200712.0001

摘要

環境政策的執行影響民眾的相關權益甚深，但現階段政府對於環境治理議題多以各主管行政機關作為政策制定及監督管理的施政機關，往往偏重技術層面，未實質採納民眾的意見來檢討修正政策內容。在民主政治下，政策的制定及執行應反映民意，始符合民主原則。而社會選擇是從集體角度出發用以制定公共財貨等相關決策，不僅能解決環境議題，且決策結果為多數人所偏好，隱含民意基礎在內。Haefele (1973)提出代議政府換票制度為可用以解決環境議題的社會選擇機制，建議由代議士代表民眾制定環境議題等相關決策並允許換票，在多數決規則下，能達成與直接民主相同的結果。本文參考Haefele (1973)的社會選擇機制，並應用於我國環境治理上，由實驗方法檢視得知該決策機制具操作可行性，且重複檢驗發現代議士採取換票手段與民眾集會決策的投票結果相同，可補足Haefele以舉例證明該論點的缺失。

關鍵字

環境治理 ； 社會選擇 ； 換票

並列摘要

Implementation of environmental policies affects deeply related benefits of the general public, but when faced with environmental governance issues the current governmental system in Taiwan makes related policies and proposes monitoring measures solely through executive administrations, biased toward the technical aspects of these issues whereas failing to adopt the opinions of the general public to review and revise the policy contents. In a democratic system, policy making and implementation should reflect the general public’s preferences in order to fulfill the principle of democracy. Social choice is derived from a collective point of view in order to make decisions related to public goods. It can not only resolve environmental issues, but also achieve decision outcomes representing the preferences of the majority of individuals. Social choice thus incorporates the principle of democracy into collective decisions. The vole-trading, representative government system proposed by Haefele (1973) can be used to resolve the social choice issues of environmental management, suggesting that through representatives in place of their constituents to make direct decisions related to environmental issues with vote-trading under the majority rule, the collective outcome is consisted with that through direct democracy. The present paper is grounded on the social choice mechanism proposed by Huefele (1973), applies that mechanism to environmental governance in Taiwan, conducts an experiment to explore the feasibility of such mechanism, and complements Haefele's deductive proof that when representatives are allowed to trade votes, the collective decision outcome is consistent with that derived from direct voting by the assembly of individuals.

並列關鍵字

Environmental Governance ； Social Choice ； Vote-trading

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