管制政策之政治經濟分析

The Economics and Politics of Regulation

張其祿(Chyi-Lu Jang)

《中國行政評論》 10卷2期 (2001/03) Pp. 71-88

https://doi.org/10.6635/cpar.2001.10(2).03

摘要

當代有兩種主要的理論經常被用於解釋政府管制措施的形成，第一種稱為市場失靈或公益理論，其認為政府以管制手段介入私人經濟活動的目的是在矯正自然獨占、資訊不充份，以及經濟外部性等自由市場運作缺失；政府管制因此具有強烈的公共利益保護色彩。與第一種理論觀點正好相反，第二種理論認為政府管制措施的形成並非基於公益考量，而是被管制的利益團體對管制當局政策遊說的結果，政府管制政策因此經常淪為利益團體用來限制市場自由競爭及不當提高財貨與勞務價格之工具，第二種理論可稱為利益團體或管制俘虜理論。不過，經驗文獻顯示沒有任何一項理論可以單獨解釋所有政府管制政策的形成。本文主要目的因此在於系統化檢視以上兩種理論觀點，並以其所提出之各項政治及經濟因素為基礎，綜合探討政府管制政策的形成原因。本文結論認為管制政策的形成是受多元政治與經濟因素的影響。

關鍵字

管制政策 ； 市場失靈 ； 利益團體 ； 管制俘虜

並列摘要

The introduction of regulation has long been explained by two sets of theories: market failure (or public interest) theories and interest group (or capture) theories. The former argues that regulation is introduced to obviate natural, monopolies, information inadequacies, and externalities that may negatively affect free market operation and thus improve social welfare. The latter expects regulation to be supplied in response to the demands of those regulated who seek the benefits of regulatory protection. However, empirical evidence has demonstrated that neither of the two sets of theories can account for all regulatory decisions. The main purpose of this paper is therefore to develop an analytical perspective on the economics and politics of regulation by first examining the major alternative types of explanation that have been advanced for the existence of regulation. The relationship among these theories and their relationship to an integrated framework that can adequately account for most regulatory decisions will then be explored. This paper lends substantial support to a pluralistic model of the determinants of government regulation.